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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Active Thermal Control Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, PCN-2, 6 April 1987. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contaired within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Active Thermal Control Subsystem (ATCS).
The major purpose of the ATCS is to remove the heat, generated
during normal Shuttle operations from the Orbiter systems and
subsystems. The four major components of the ATCS contributing
to the heat removal are:
O Freon Coolant Loops
O Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
O Flash Evaporator System
0 Ammonia Boiler System
The IOA analysis followed this major breakdown structure, with
the additional enhancement of examining each category from both
the mechanical and electrical perspectives.
In order to perform the analysis, the IOA process utilized
available ATCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining
hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level
of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes
and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of
the effect for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the four major subdivisions of the ATCS. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the four major subdivisions of the ATCS. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
+ ...............
I Summary of ATCS Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F) I
I .... I
I Criticality : l 1/l I 2/IRI 2/2 1 3/IRI 3/2RI 3/3 I TOTAL I
I I I I I I I I i
I Number : I 4 I 89 1 4 I 451 79 I 89 I 310 I
4 +
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
mm_ommlm_
l Summary of ATCS Potential Critical Items (HW/F) I
I ..................................... I
I Criticality: I 1/1 I 2/1Rl 2/2 1 3/IRI 3/2RI TOTAL I
t I I I I ( t t
i Number : I 4 t 89 t 4 I 0 l 4 I 101 I
Of the 310 failure modes analyzed, 101 were determined to be PCIs.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem component&
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 ATCS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ATCS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were
defined to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the
ground rules and assumptions contained in NSTS 22206.
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Active Thermal Control Subsystem (ATCS) is made up of four
major systems consisting of the Freon Coolant Loop (FCL),
Radiator and Flow Control Assembly (RFCA), Flash Evaporator
System (FES), and Ammonia Boiler System (ABS). The ATCS is
shown schematically in Figure 2.
Freon Coolant Loops
The Orbiter ATCS continuously circulates Freon 21 through two
independent Freon Coolant Loops (FCL). Each loop consists of two
redundant pumps, one accumulator, flow control valves, and several
heat exchangers.
The FCL transfers heat from many orbiter systems while dumping
the excess to either Ground Support Equipment (GSE) or the
environment, depending upon mission phase. The main components
that require cooling by the FCL are the three fuel cell stacks,
equipment mounted to midbody coldplates, payload water coolant
loop, and aft avionics/rate gyro assembly coldplates.
Furthermore, the FCL is designed to provide heat to the hydraulic
fluid and cabin oxygen.
During the prelaunch phase, heat is transferred from the FCL
through the GSE heat exchanger. After lift-off, the General
Purpose Computer (GPC) sends a command tc initiate cooling of the
FCL by the FES which continues until the payload bay doors are
opened on-orbit. While the shuttle is on-orbit, heat removal
from the FCLs is performed primarily by the radiators. The FES
is available, however, to supplement the radiators as required.
Prior to de-orbit prep, the radiators are cold soaked. This
cold-soaking allows the radiators to act as heat sinks when the
payload bay doors are closed during entr). The primary heat
extraction mechanism during entry is the FES, however.
Additionally, the ABS will act as a supplement to the cold-soaked
radiators when it is activated and the F}S deactivated by GPC
command at an altitude of 120K ft.
Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
The radiator is used as the primary method of rejecting heat from
the Orbiter while on-orbit and as the secondary method during
ascent and entry. Eight panels make up the radiator, four on
each payload by door. To increase heat rejection, the two
forward panels on each door can be deployed. Once deployed, the
forward panels are capable of radiating heat from both sides. The
basic heat rejection capability from the panels is 61,000
BTU/hr, but is dependent on the Orbiter attitude.
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The Flow Control Assembly (FCA) is locate_ downstream of the
radiator panels. The main components of the FCA are the bypass
valve, flow control valve, mode control valve and several
controllers. The main purpose of the FCA is to control flow by
either bypassing the radiator panels completely, as during a cold
soak, or, by allowing a certain percentage of warm freon to
bypass the panels.
Flash Evaporator System
There are two flash evaporators: a high load evaporator which is
sized to reject 95,000 BTU/hr; and a topping evaporator, sized to
reject 35,500 BTU/hr. Both evaporators are used to reject these
heat loads from the freon coolant loops during ascent at
altitudes above 140,000 and during entry at altitudes above
120,000 ft. Additionally, the topping evaporater can be used as
necessary to supplement the radiators during on-orbit operations.
The basic concept behind the operation of the flash evaporators
is to flash water at its triple point pressure. To facilitate
this flashing, the evaporators are cylindrical with a finned
inner core. The hot Freon 21 from the cooling loops flows around
the finned core and water is sprayed onto the core from the
nozzles in each evaporator. The water is vaporized and this
process removes approximately 1,000 BTU per pound of water. In
addition to the finned core, Freon 21 also flows through an anti-
carryover device (ACOD) inside the evaporator to reduce the
amount of water droplets in the exit duct.
The water used for the flash evaporator operation comes from the
supply water subsystem via two feedlines. A series of heaters
maintain the desired temperature in both feedlines. An
accumulator in each feedline maintains the required operating
pressure. Each feedline separates in the vicinity of the
evaporators so that each evaporator has an inlet valve/nozzle
combination from each feedline. This yields redundant water
supply paths for each evaporator.
Following vaporization in the flash evaporators, the water vapor
is vented overboard via heated exit ducts terminating in sonic
nozzles. The topping evaporator has dual exit ducts terminating
in sonic nozzles and configured to provide non-propulsive
venting. The high load evaporator has orly one exit duct and
gives a propulsive venting effect when used. There are concerns
about the use of the high load evaporator when the vernier jets
are being used to control the vehicle. }'or these reasons, and
also to prevent possible payload contamination from the high load
evaporator venting, the high load evaporator is not used while
on-orbit.
The flash evaporator operation is controlled by three controllers
(primary A, primary B, and secondary). The primary controllers
operate in conjunction with a given feedline (A or B) and are
capable of controlling both the topping and high load evaporators
simultaneously. When using the secondary" controller with the
8
high load evaporator, it is necessary to select either the A or
the B feedline. The secondary controller will use both feedlines
simultaneously when controlling the topping evaporator.
The controllers operate by opening the evaporator valve/nozzle at
a frequency determined by the temperature of the Freon 21 loop at
the appropriate evaporator exit. The primary controllers will
set this pulsing at a frequency so that the topping evaporator is
activated at an exit temperature of 62 degrees F; and is inhibited
when the exit temperature reaches a lower limit of 43 degrees F.
Included in the primary controller circuitry is over- and under-
temperature shutdown logic to protect the evaporators.
Ammonia Boiler System
The ammonia boiler system cools the freon coolant loop below
120,000 feet and until the GSE is connected by evaporating liquid
anhydrous ammonia. The system configuration allows two
independent redundant paths to supply am/Tonia to the boiler. The
main components of the ABS are the shell and tube heat exchanger
(i), controllers (2), several control valves (6), and storage
tanks (2). Ammonia tank control valves are operated by the
controllers to deplete one tank before switching to the alternate
tank. Since one tank will typically provide all the required
cooling, the order of tank initiation is switched from flight to
flight. However, due to current entry configuration of the
radiators/FES, operation the ABS is not required and is maintained
as contingency backup.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The location of the ATCS components on the Orbiter are shown in
Figure 3.
The ATCS interfaces with the Air Revitalization System (ARS) at
the H20/Freon interchanger. At the interchanger, heat collected
by the ARS is transferred to freon. The heat is then transferred
to Ground Support Equipment (GSE) or into space. The Electrical
Power System (EPS) and pressurization systems have heat removed
by the ATCS. The hydraulic system is warmed at the hydraulic
heat exchanger by hot freon.
The Active Thermal Control System interfaces with the Electrical
Power Distribution & Control (EPD&C) system, the Display and
Control (D&C) system, the instrumentation system, and GPC
software. The EPD&C system provides the electric power and the
control assemblies for motors and valves. The D&C system
provides the capability for the crew to monitor, configure or
manually control the systems where necessary. The
instrumentation system processes the performance parameters
required for system monitoring and control. The GPC software
provides automatic control.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 4 illustrates the hierarchy of the ATCS hardware and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 5 through 22 comprise
the detailed system representation.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the four major subdivisions
of the ATCS. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions
and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent
paragraphs.
TABLE I Summary of ATCS Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
FCL
RFCA
FES
ABS
TOTAL
i/1 2/1R
1 55
0 7
1 16
2 ll
4 89
2/2
0
0
4
0
4
3/IR
0
0
45
0
45
3/2R
17
22
40
0
79
3/3
35
ll
28
15
89
TOTAL
108
40
134
28
310
Of the 310 failure modes analyzed, 101 failures were determined to
be Potential Critical Items (PCIs). A summary of the potential
critical items is presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a
cross reference between each Potential Critical Item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
TABLE II Summary of ATCS Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
FCL
RFCA
FES
ABS
l/l 2/IR
55
7
16
II
2/2
0
0
4
0
3/IR
0
0
0
0
3/2R
3
0
1
0
TOTAL
59
7
22
13
4.1 Freon Coolant Loop
The Freon Coolant (FCL) analysis identified 108 failure modes.
The FCL anlaysis breakdown is illustrated in Figures 5 through
12. Most of the failure modes were identified as criticality
2/IR or 3/3. 59 PCIs were identified and are listed in
Appendix D.
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4.2 Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
The Radiator and Flow Control Assembly (RFCA) analysis
identified 40 failure modes. The RFCA analysis breakdown is
illustrated in Figures 13 through 15. Most of the failure modes
were identified as either criticality 3/2R or 3/3. 7 PCIs were
identified and are listed in Appendix D.
4.3 Flash Evaporator System
The Flash Evaporator System (FES) analysis identified 134
failure modes. The FES analysis breakdown is illustrated in
Figures 16 through 20. Most of the failure modes were identified
as either criticality 3/1R or 3/2R. 22 PCIs were identified and
are listed in Appendix D.
4.4 Ammonia Boiler System
The Ammonia Boiler System (ABS) analysis identified 28 failure
modes. The ABS analysis breakdown is illustrated in Figures 21
and 22. Most of the failure modes were identified as either
criticality 2/1R or 3/3. 13 PCIs were identified and are listed
in Appendix D.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
A-I
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
ABS
AC
ACOD
ALC
ALCA
AOA
AOS
ARS
ASSY
ATCS
ATO
BTU
C&W
CB
CIL
CNTLR
CRIT
D&C
DIST
DS
ECLSS
EMU
EPDC
EPS
F
F
F
FCA
FCL
FES
FMEA
FRAC
ft
GAS
GFE
GPC
GSE
H20
HP
hr
HW
HX
HZ
ID
INTCHGR
IOA
- Ammonia Boiler System
- Alternating Current
- Anti-Carryover Device
- Aft Load Controller
- Aft Load Control Assembly
- Abort-Once-Around
- Acquisition of Signal
- Atmospheric Revitalization System
- Assembly
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort-To-Orbit
- British Thermal Units
- Caution and Warning
- Circuit Breaker
- Critical Items List
- Controller
- Criticality
- Displays and Controls
- Distribution
- Digital Signal
- Environmental Control and Life Support System (Subsystem
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Electrical Power, Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power System
- Fahrenheit
- Failed
- Functional
- Flow Control Assembly
- Freon Coolant Loop
- Flash Evaporator System
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Fraction
- Feet
- Get-Away Special
- Government Furnished Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Water
- Horsepower
- Hour
- Hardware
- Heat Exchanger
- Hertz
- Identifier
- Interchanger
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
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ACRONYMS
JSC
LCA
MC
MDAC
MDM
MM
NA
NASA
NC
NH3
NO
NSTS
O2
OPS
P
P/L
PASS
PCA
PCI
PCN
PNL
R
RAD
RCS
RFCA
RGA
RI
RTLS
SM
SOP
SSSH
STS
TAL
TEMP
VAC
VRCS
WP
- Johnson Space Center
- Load Controller Assembly
- Memory Configuration
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Major Mode
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Normally Closed
- Ammonia
- Normally Open
- National Space Transportation System
- Oxygen
- Operations Sequence
- Pass
- Payload
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Page Change Notice
- Panel
- Redundancy
- Radiator
- Reaction Control System
- Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
- Rate Gyro Assembly
- Rockwell International
- Return-to-Launch Site
- Systems Management
- Secondary Oxygen Pack
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Temperature
- Volts, ac
- Vernier Reaction Control System
- Working Paper
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
o_ FMEA/CIL, PCN-2, 6 April 1987, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
_NTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or
expected in anticipated operational environmental
conditions. Excludes an event where multiple failures must
first occur to result in environmental extremes
CQNTINGE_CY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized
beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket
checklists, and cue cards
EARLY M_SSION TERMINATION - termination of on-orbit phase
prior to planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated
the highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational
sequence (OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software
System (PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight
with payload/objective accomplishments including orbit
phasing and altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as
GAS cans, middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a
single cause or event of all units which perform a necessary
(critical) function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized
beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket
checklists, and cue cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission
objectives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRE_AUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHAS_ - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102)
and ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ON-ORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8
and ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DE-ORBIT p_ASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22_06, Instructions for
Preparatio_ Qf FMEA/CIL, PCN-2, 6 April 1987, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
,
•
•
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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••
•
•
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed•
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
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B.3 ATCS-Speoific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the ATCS subsystem. The analysis considered the worst case
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem,
mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
i. For redundancy definitions; the high load evaporator is not
redundant to the topping evaporator during on-orbit operation•
RATIONALE: During on-orbit operations, the topping
evaporator is used: (1) to eliminate the
excess heat load which cannot be handled by
the radiators alone; and, (2) to provide an
alternate means of performing a water dump.
The topping evaporator operation also
results in "balanced venting" with no
propulsive effects. The high load evaporator
would operate erratically at the heat levels
of the topping. The high load results in
propulsive venting and concern for vehicle
control if used with the VRCS. Payload
contamination concerns also limit the use
of the high load evaporator on orbit. Due to
evaporator these negative effects, the high load
cannot be considered as redundant to the
topping evaporator.
• Orbiter attitudes and payload cooling requirements
necessitate the use of the topping evaporator for the entire
mission.
RATIONALE : Worst case. Some attitudes require only
the radiators. Requiring the use of the
FES for the entire mission results in a
worst case scenario.
. The two exit duct/sonic nozzle systems for the topping
evaporator are not redundant to each other.
RATIONALE: The topping evaporator is sized to reject a
given heat load with both nozzles
operational• Loss of one duct/nozzle would
reduce the operational heat load.
Additionally, the configuration is such
that the venting is nonpropulsive when
both duct/nozzles are used. Using only one
duct/nozzle would result in a propulsive
venting with subsequent impacts on the
attitude hold and RCS jet systems.
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•e
•
During ascent and entry, the high load evaporator is
redundant to the freon coolant loops.
RATIONALE: Definition of redundancy. Loss of both the
high load evaporator and one freon loop can
lead to the loss of crew/vehicle. Defining
redundancy as above allows the end result
to be reflected in the criticalities.
Loss of the topping evaporator on-orbit, is a loss of
mission.
RATIONALE: The loss of the topping evaporator will
mean attitude changes and power level
reductions. These changes result in
changes to the mission profile and mission
length. Taken together, this means a loss
of mission.
During on-orbit operations, the FES and the fuel cell drain
vent line provide an unlike redundancy to the water dump
capability.
RATIONALE: Conservative approach. If a leak in one of
the feedlines occurs, then the steps to
isolate the leak can also isolate the water
dump system from the water tanks. When
this occurs, the FES must function as an
unlike redundancy item to dump excess water
from the storage tanks. If leaks occur in
both feedlines, they must be isolated
leaving no "primary" method of dumping water.
.
•
In analysis cases where the meaning of hardware item redundancy
seems ambiguous, redundancy is understood to mean that there is
one or more systems that are redundant to the system in which
the hardware item occurs.
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption
for purposes of determining criticality•
Loss of redundancy means loss of all capability to perform
function•
o
I0.
RATIONALE: Maintain uniform usage within project.
Caps and fittings for quick disconnects are considered one
component.
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption.
Leaks (GN2, hydraulic fluid, water) are sufficiently prolonged
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in time to allow recognition and response.
RATIONALE: This assumption allows for non-trivial case
analysis.
ii. Contamination of all freon coolant loops during turnaround
servicing is not considered a "single credible event" in
evaluating Redundancy Screen C.
RATIONALE: This is considered a ground operations problem
although the significant number of inflight
system anomalies attributed to contamination
suggests that it should be analyzed
independently as a potential cause of critical
failure modes. Without this assumption, all
system failure modes that list contamination
as a cause would fail screen C.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the Active Thermal Control Subsystem. The
information on these worksheets is intentionally similar to the
FMEA's written by Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets
identifies the item being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as
the function. For each failure mode, the possible causes are out
lined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality for each
mission phase is listed, as described in the NSTS 22206,
Instructions _or Preparation of FMEA and CIL. PCN-2, 6 April 1987.
Finally, effects are entered at the bottom of each sheet, and the
worst case criticality is entered at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 = Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
Preceeding the actual analysis worksheets are summary tables
containing a complete listing of all identified failure modes and
the associated criticalities.
C-2
TABLE C.l FREON COOLANT LOOP ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
i000
i001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
I010
I011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P F P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 3/2R 3/2R F F P
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P N P
* 3/2R 3/2R P F P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/3 3/3
* 2/1R 2/IR P F P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/1R 2/1R P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR I/I
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/1R P P P
INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
ORIFICE (INLET COUPLING)
PUMP INLET PRESSURE SENSOR
INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR)
INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR)
ACCUMULATOR
SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT
QUANTITY SENSOR
INLET FILTER (FREON PUMP)
INLET FILTER (FREON PUMP)
FREON PUMP
FREON PUMP
3-PHASE MOTOR
3-PHASE MOTOR
OUTLET FILTER
OUTLET FILTER
CHECK VALVE
OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
ORIFICE (OUTLET COUPLING)
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGERS
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGERS
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGERS
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGERS
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
02 RESTRICTOR
02 RESTRICTOR
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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TABLE C.I FREON COOLANT LOOP ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS - CONT'D.
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/1R P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR F P P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3 P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3 P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3
* 3/2R 3/2R F F P
* 2/1R 2/1R P P P
* 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/3 3/3
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3
* 2/iR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3/3 3/3
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGE
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGE
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGE
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGE
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGE
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGE
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGE
INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FLOW RATE SENSOR INTERCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
FLOW RATE SENSOR PAYLOAD HX
SERVICING QUICK DISCONNECT CAP
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
ACTUATOR (FLOW PROP VLV)
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
ORIFICE (AFT AV COLDPLATES)
AFT COLDPLATE FLOWRATE SENSOR
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
ORIFICE (RGA COLDPLATES)
RGA COLDPLATES
RGA COLDPLATES
RGA COLDPLATES
FREON LOOP LINES AND FITTINGS
CIRCUIT BREAKERS (FREON PUMP)
SWITCH (FREON PUMPS)
SWITCH (FREON PUMPS)
SWITCH (FREON PUMPS)
RESISTOR (FREON PUMPS)
RESISTOR (FREON PUMPS)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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TABLE C.l FREON COOLANT LOOP ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS - CONCLD.
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
ii00
ii01
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
3/2R P P P
3/2R P P P
3/2R P P P
3/2R P P P
3/2R P P P
3/3
* 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR P P P
3/2R P P P
3/3
* 2/IR P P P
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
2/1R
2/IR
3/2R
3/3
2/1R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3t3
3"3
MDM BLOCKING DIODE-FREON PUMPS
MDM BLOCKING DIODE-FREON PUMPS
HYBRID DRIVER (FREON PUMPS)
HYBRID DRIVER (FREON PUMPS)
RELAY SOLENOID (FREON PUMPS)
RELAY SOLENOID (FREON PUMPS)
CB (FREON FLOW PROPORTIONING)
SW (FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV)
SW (FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV)
SW 21 (FLOW PROP VLV)
SIGNAL CONDITIONER (ATCS OF1)
RESISTOR (FLOW PROP VLV)
RESISTOR (FLOW PROP VLV)
BLOCKING DIODE (INTERCHANGER)
BLOCKING DIODE (INTERCHANGER)
BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX)
BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX)
INDICATOR (FLOW PROP VLV)
INDICATOR (FLOW PROP VLV)
INDICATOR (FLOW PROP VLV)
CB (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
CB (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
SW i0 (FREON SGNL COND)
SW I0 (FREON SGNL COND)
SW i0 (FREON SGNL COND)
SWITCH 4 (FREON)
FREON FLOW VOLTMETER
FREON EVAP OUT TEMP VOLTMTR
FREON C&W LIGHT
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-ID
TABLE C.2 RFCA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
312R 312R P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
* 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/2R 3/2R P P P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, TUBES
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
STEPPING MTR (FLOW CNTRL VLV)
BYPASS VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
MOTOR (BYPASS VALVE)
MODE CONTROL VALVE
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
CB 14 (FREON RADIATOR CNTRLLR)
SW 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP)
SW 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP)
DIODE (RADIATOR FLOW CNTRLLR)
DIODE (RADIATOR FLOW CNTRLLR)
RESISTOR (RAD FLOW CNTRLLR)
RESISTOR (RAD FLOW CNTRLLR)
SW 25 (RAD CONTROL OUT TEMP)
SW 25 (RAD CONTROL OUT TEMP)
CB (RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE)
SW 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
SW 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
SW 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
RESISTOR (PRECEDES $35)
RESISTOR (PRECEDES S35)
SW 35 (RAD CNTRLLR BYPASS VLV)
SW 35 (RAD CNTRLLR BYPASS VLV)
HYBRID DRIVER
HYBRID DRIVER
RESISTOR (BYPASS VLV INDICATOR)
RESISTOR (BYPASS VLV INDICATOR)
DIODE (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR)
DIODE (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR)
BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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TABLE C.3 FLASH EVAPORATORSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
MDAC- I D
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3000
3001
3002
3003
3004
3005
3006
3007
3008
3009
3010
3011
3012
3013
3014
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020
3021
3022
3023
3024
3025
3026
3027
3028
3029
3030
3031
3032
3033
3034
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
3040
3041
3042
3043
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/3 3/3
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE TEMP SNSR
HI LOAD FEEDLINE
HI LOAD FEEDLINE
HI LOAD FEEDLINE HEATER
HI LOAD FEEDLINE HTR THERMOSTAT
HI LOAD FEEDLINE HTR THERMOSTAT
40 MCRN FILTER-HI LOAD WTR VLV
HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE
HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE
HI LOAD PULSER VALVE
HI LOAD PULSER VALVE
HI LOAD SPRAY NOZZLES
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR CORE
HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE
HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE
HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR ACOD
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR ACOD
HI LOAD ACOD
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT
HI LOAD HTRS - ZONE A
HI LOAD TEMP MONITOR - ZONE A
HI LOAD HTR THERMOSTAT-ZONE A
HI LOAD HTR THERMOSTAT-ZONE A
HI LOAD NOZZLE HEATER
HI LOAD NZL TEMP SNSR/CNTRLLR
HI LOAD NZL TEMP SNSR/CNTRLLR
HI LOAD DUCT NZL TEMP MONITOR
HI LOAD NOZZLE
HI LOAD NOZZLE
FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER
TOPPING FDLN HTR THERMOSTAT
TOPPING FDLN HTR THERMOSTAT
TOPPING FDLN HTR TEMP SNSR
TOPPING EVAP WTR VLV FILTER
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOL VLV
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOL VLV
TOPPING EVAP INTEGRAL PLSR VLV
TOPPING EVAP INTEGRAL PLSR VLV
TOPPING EVAP INTEGRAL PLSR VLV
TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOL VLV
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-7
TABLE C.3 FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS - CONT'D.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
3044 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3045 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3046 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3047 * i/i i/I
3048 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3049 * 2/2 2/2
3050 3/3 3/3
3051 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3052 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3053 * 2/2 2/2
3054 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3055 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3056 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3057 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3058 3/3 3/3
3059 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3060 3/2R 3/2R P N N
3061 3/2R 3/2R P N N
3062 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3063 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3064 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3065 3/3 3/3
3066 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3067 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
3068 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3069 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3070 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3071 3/3 3/3
3072 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3073 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3074 3/2R 3/2R P N P
3075 3/3 3/3
3076 3/3 3/3
3077 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3078 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3079 * 2/2 2/2
3080 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3081 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3082 3/3 3/3
3083 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3084 3/3 3/3
3085 3/IR 3/IR P N P
3086 3/3 3/3
3087 3/IR 3/IR P N P
ITEM NAME
TOPPING EVAP INTEGRAL PLSR VLV
TOPPING EVAP WTR VLV MTG PLATE
TOPPING EVAP WTR VLV MTG PLATE
TOPPING EVAP WTR VLV MTG PLATE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ACOD
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ACOD
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ACOD
TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT
TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT
TPNG EVAP ZONE D,E,F,H HTRS
TPNG EVAP ZONE D,E,F,H HTRS
TPNG EVAP ZONE D,E,F,H HTRS
TPNG EVAP ZONE D,E,F,H MON
TPNG EVAP ZONE D,E,F,H THERM
TPNG EVAP SONIC NOZZLES
TPNG EVAP SONIC NOZZLES
TPNG EVAP ZONE G,I HTRS
TPNG EVAP ZONE G,I HTR CNTRLS
TPNG EVAP ZONE G,I HTR CNTRLS
TPNG EVAP ZONE G,I HTR MONTRS
FES FEEDLINE A/B
FES FEEDLINE A/B
FES FEEDLINE HEATERS
FES FEEDLINE HTR THERMOSTAT
FES FEEDLINE HTR THERMOSTAT
FES FEEDLINE TEMP SENSOR
FES ACCUMULATOR HEATER
FES ACCUMULATOR HTR THERMOSTAT
FES ACCUMULATOR HTR THERMOSTAT
FES ACCUMULATOR TEMP MONITOR
FES FDLN ACCUM STATUS MONITOR
FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR
FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR
FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH
FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH
FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH
FES CONTROLLER SWITCH STATUS
FES CONTROLLER INPUT DIODES
FES CONTROLLER INPUT RESISTORS
FES CONTROL SW INPUT RESISTORS
FES CONTROL SW INPUT RESISTORS
FES CONTROLLER POWER COMP
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-8
TABLE C. 3 FLASH EVAPORATORSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEETS - CNCLD.
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F a B C ITEM NAME
3088 *
3089 *
3090
3091
3092
3093
3094
3095
3096
3097
3098
3099
3100
3101
3102
3103
3104
3105
3106
3107
3108
3109
3110
3111
3112
3113
3114
3115
3116
3117
3118 *
3119
3120
3121
3122
3123
3124
3125
3126
3127
3128 *
3129
3130
3131
3132
3133
2/1R 2/IR P N F
3/2R 3/2R P N F
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
313 313
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/IR 3/1R P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/1R 3/1R P N P
3/1R 3/1R P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/iR P N P
2/2 2/2
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/2R 3/2R P N P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/2R P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
3/IR 3/IR P N P
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH STATUS
FES CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY
FES PRIMARY CNTRLLRMDPNT SNSR
FES PRIMARY CNTRLLR MDPNT SNSR
FES PRIMARY CNTRLLR MDPNT SNSR
FES SEC CNTRLLR MIDPOINT SNSR
FES SEC CNTRLLR MIDPOINT SNSR
FES PRIMARY CNTRLLR EVAP SNSR
FES PRIMARY CNTRLLR EVAP SNSR
FES SEC CNTRLLR EVAP OUT SNSR
FES SEC CNTRLLR EVAP OUT SNSR
FES PRIM CNTRLLR SHUTDOWN SNSR
FES PRIM CNTRLLR SHUTDOWN SNSR
FES CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC
FES CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC
HI-LOAD VALVE PLSR ELECTRONICS
HI-LOAD VALVE PLSR ELECTRONICS
HI-LOAD ISOLATION VALVE RELAY
HI-LOAD SPRAY VALVE RELAY
TPPNG EVAP ISOLATION VLV RELAY
TPPNG EVAP SPRAY VALVE RELAY
GROUND OPS DIAG MEASUREMENTS
FES SECONDARY SUPPLY SELECT SW
FES SECONDARY SUPPLY SELECT SW
FES FEEDLINE HEATER SELECT SW
FES FEEDLINE HEATER SELECT SW
FES FEEDLINE HTR SWITCH STATUS
FES FEEDLINE HEATER FUSES
TOPPING EVAP HEATER SELECT SW
TOPPING EVAP HEATER SELECT SW
TOPPING EVAP HEATER SELECT SW
TPNG EVAP HTR SELECT SW FUSES
TOPPING EVAP HTR FUSES/RPCS
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HTR RELAY
TPNG EVAP NOZZLE HTR SELECT SW
TPNG EVAP NOZZLE HTR SELECT SW
TPNG EVAP NOZZLE HTR SELECT SW
TPNG EVAP NOZZLE HTR FUSES
HI-LOAD HEATER SWITCH
HI-LOAD HEATER SELECT SWITCH
HI-LOAD DUCT HTR SWITCH STATUS
HI-LOAD DUCT HTR SWITCH FUSES
HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER FUSES/RPCS
HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER RELAYS
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-9
TABLE C.4 AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
MDAC-ID
4001 *
4002 *
4003
4004
4005 *
4006 *
4007 *
4008
4009
4010
4011 *
4012 *
4013 *
4014 *
4015 *
4016 *
4017
4018
4019
4020
4021 *
4022 *
4023
4024
4025
4026
4027
4028
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F a B C
313 211R P N P
313 211R P N P
313 3/3
313 313
3/3 211R P N P
3/3 2/1R P N P
3/3 2/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 2/IR P S P
3/3 2/IR P S P
2/IR 2/IR P P P
3/3 i/l
3/3 2/IR P N P
3/3 1/1
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 2/IR P N P
3/3 2/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
ITEM NAME
RELIEF VALVE (NH3)
RELIEF VALVE
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (NH3 TANK)
TEMP TRANSDUCER (NH3 TANK)
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N. O. )
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
TEMP SENSOR (NH3 CONTROLLER)
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)
NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER
NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER
TANK, LINES & FITTINGS
LINES & FITTINGS
LINES
TEMP TRANSDUCER (NH3 EXHAUST)
RESISTOR (NH3 CONTROLLER)
RESISTOR (NH3 CONTROLLER)
SWITCH 42 (NH3 CONTROLLER)
SWITCH 42 (NH3 CONTROLLER)
RESISTOR (NH3 FEEDBACK)
RESISTOR (NH3 FEEDBACK)
DIODES (GPC)
DIODES (GPC)
HYBRID DRIVER (POWER-PRI/GPC)
HYBRID DRIVER (NH3 CONTROLLER)
(*) Potential critical Items.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87
ATCS
i000
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY, AREA 40
40V63TP201, TP203
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE IN
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS OF FREON
LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO
HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-ll
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
I001 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE (INLET COUPLING)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63TP201, TP203
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW FROM WITHIN THE ORIFICE REDUCES THE COOLING
CAPABILITY PROVIDED BY ONE OF THE FREON COOLANT LOOPS. FOR LOSS
OF ONE LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
IF BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS FAIL, CREW AND VEHICLE WOULD
BE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1002 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUMP INLET PRESSURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-MT4, MTI2
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TELEMETRY CONTAINS UNRELIABLE PRESSURE DATA ON FLUID ENTERING THE
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY. REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA
WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1003 ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP RESULTS FROM AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLOW THROUGH THE FILTER. ENTRY IS THEN
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. IF BOTH FREON COOLANT
LOOPS FAIL, CREW AND VEHICLE WOULD BE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE
TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FILTER ELEMENTS MAY COMBINE WITH THE FILTERS PRECEDING THE FREON
PUMPS AND THUS REDUCE THE FLOW RATE IN ONE COOLANT LOOP. THIS,
IN TURN COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF MISSION. A FAILURE IN THE
REDUNDANT COOLANT LOOP ELIMINATES ORBITER COOLING AND RESULTS
IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACCUMULATOR
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACCUMULATOR IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE HEAD PRESSURE TO FREON
PUMPS IN ONE COOLANT LOOP, WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
IF A SECOND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE REDUNDANT FREON COOLANT LOOP,
I) CREW AND VEHICLE MAY BE LOST, 2) NITROGEN IN THE
FREON COOLANT LOOP COULD LEAD TO WINDMILLING OF THE FREON PUMPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP
3) FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
ACCUMULATOR
SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT CAPPED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63TP209
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE DISCONNECT IS CONTAINED BY THE REDUNDANT
CAP. IF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CONTAIN NITROGEN FAILS, ONE FREON
COOLANT LOOP WILL BE LOST. THE LATTER DUE TO INABILITY TO
PROVIDE ADEQUATE FREON PRESSURE TO THE PUMPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5126187
ATCS
1007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUANTITY SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
B)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
ACCUMULATOR
QUANTITY TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY-AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V63-PPI, PP2
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FREON LOOP CANNOT BE MONITORED USING THE QUANTITY SENSOR.
HOWEVER, REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH
COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET FILTER (FREON PUMP)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKED FLOW AT THE INLET FILTER RESTRICTS FREON FROM ONE OF TWO
REDUNDANT PUMPS IN THE COOLANT LOOP. WITH LOSS OF BOTH FREON
PUMPS IN ONE COOLANT LOOP, THE MISSION IS LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1009 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET FILTER (FREON PUMP)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP
3) FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PIECES OF THE RUPTURED FILTER MAY DAMAGE THE ASSOCIATED FREON
PUMP AND THUS, LEAD TO FAILURE OF THAT PUMP. WITH LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO PROVIDE FLOW WITHIN A FREON COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
i010 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREON PUMP
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
CENTRIFUGAL PUMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63PPI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT FREON PUMPS IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FLOW IN THE
ASSOCIATED COOLANT LOOP. ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY
LANDING SITE, WHEN A LOSS OF BOTH FREON PUMPS IN ONE COOLANT LOOP
OCCURS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
i011 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREON PUMP
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
CENTRIFUGAL PUMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: 40V63-PPI, PP2
B [ P ] c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS OF FREON
LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO
HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1012 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-PHASE MOTOR
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP
3) FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
CENTRIFUGAL PUMP
3-PHASE MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-PPI, PP2
CAUSES:
SHOCK
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE REDUNDANT PUMP IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FLOW IN ONE FREON COOLANT
LOOP. WITH LOSS OF BOTH PUMPS IN SAID FREON COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY
IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1013 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-PHASE MOTOR
LOSS OF 1 PHASE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
CENTRIFUGAL PUMP
3-PHASE MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY-AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V63-PPI, PP2
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PUMP CAN BE STARTED AND OPERATED IN A DEGRADED MODE ON TWO-PHASE
POWER. FLOW IN THE FREON COOLANT LOOP WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE
REDUNDANT PUMP SHOULD LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POWER THE PUMP
MOTOR OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5112/87
ATCS
i014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTLET FILTER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
OUTLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-PPI, PP2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PIECES OF FILTER MAY CLOG DOWNSTREAM COMPONENTS, CAUSING LOSS OF
FLOW THROUGH THE FREON COOLANT LOOP. ENTRY IS THEN REQUIRED AT
THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE SHOULD SAID COOLANT LOOP FAIL.
SHOULD ALL REDUNDANCY TO COOL THE ORBITER FAIL, CREW
AND VEHICLE WILL BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1015 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTLET FILTER
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
OUTLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-PPI, PP2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A BLOCKED FILTER WILL RESTRICT FREON FROM EXITING ONE REDUNDANT
PUMP IN THE ASSOCIATED COOLANT LOOP. LOSS OF BOTH FREON PUMPS IN
ONE COOLANT LOOP RESULTS IN A LOST MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP
3) FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63PPI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WINDMILLING OF PUMP MAY ALLOW FREON TO CYCLE INSIDE THE PUMP
ASSEMBLY, WHICH ELIMINATES FLOW THROUGH THE REMAINING COOLANT
LOOP. FOR LOSS OF ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT
THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. SHOULD BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS
FAIL, CREW AND VEHICLE WOULD BE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE
TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/26/87
ATCS
1017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/!R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63TP205, TP207
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO THE
REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT
CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS OF FREON LEAKING
INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO
IMPACT ON THE ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7117187
ATCS
1018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE (OUTLET COUPLING)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY
OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE ORIFICE REDUCES THE COOLING CAPABILITY
OF ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. WHERE THE LOSS OF ONE FREON COOLANT
LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
SHOULD BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS FAIL, CREW AND VEHICLE
WOULD BE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
i019 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (F21 TO FC40)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXII
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL LEAKAGE WITHIN FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER RESULTS IN THE
MIXING OF FREON AND FC40. MIXING OF THESE FLUIDS RESULTS IN ONE
COOLANT LOOP AND FUEL CELL LOOP TO BE LOST, THUS REQUIRING ENTRY
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE THAT
ELIMINATES THE REDUNDANT FREON COOLANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF
CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE
ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (F21 TO F21)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXll
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN A FREON-TO-FREON LOOP LEAK OCCURS, TWO COOLANT LOOPS BEGIN
TO FUNCTION AS ONE. AN INTERLOOP LEAK REQUIRES ENTERING AT THE
NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE
LOOPS OCCUR, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1021 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGERS
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FC40 TO FC40)
LEAD ANALYST: M.R. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: 40V63HXII
B [ P ] c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
1/4 INCH WELD AT HEAT EXCHANGER CAN CAUSE LOSS OF 2 FUEL CELLS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6112187
ATCS
1022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXll
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHOULD THERE BE A DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY
IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE
IN THE REDUNDANT LOOP WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE,
SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
EFFECTS OF FREON LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER,
IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1023 ABORT:
ITEM :
FAILURE MODE :
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FC40)
LEAD ANALYST: M.R. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: 40V63HXll
B [ P ] c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLANT TO FCP MAY CAUSE i) OVERHEATING, 2) POSSIBLE
REACTANT CROSSOVER, WHICH MAY LEAD TO EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1024 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
RESTRICTED FLOW (F21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXll
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE HEAT EXCHANGER CAUSES A REDUCTION IN
THE COOLING CAPABILITY FROM ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE, SHOULD A LOSS OF ONE
FREON LOOP OCCUR, FAILURE OF BOTH FREON LOOPS RESULTS IN LOSS
OF CREW AND VEHICLE SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE
ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1025 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21 TO HYDRAULIC FLUID)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 56V63HX2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL LEAKAGE WITHIN THE HEAT EXCHANGER LEADS TO MIXING OF
FREON AND HYDRAULIC FLUID WHICH RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE FREON
COOLANT LOOP AND ONE HYDRAULIC LOOP. ELIMINATION OF THE
REDUNDANT FREON COOLANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE,
SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGERS
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON TO FREON)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HX2
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING A FREON-TO-FREON LOOP LEAK, TWO COOLANT LOOPS CONTINUE TO
FUNCTION AS ONE, WITH ENTRY BEING REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY
LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE (I.E.-EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) IN THE
FREON LOOPS LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1027 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGERS
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (HYDRAULIC TO HYDRAULIC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W .E . PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HX2
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING CIRCULATION PUMP OPERATIONS, HYDRAULIC QUANTITY SENSORS
MUST BE MONITORED TO ASSURE CONSISTENT VOLUMES OF THE TWO SYSTEMS
REMAIN CONSTANT. FOR MAIN PUMP OPERATIONS, FLUID WITHIN THESE
SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT FLOW THROUGH THE HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER.
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IN THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM DEGRADES PERFORMANCE OF
THE ORBITER AERO SURFACES, WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HX2
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE SHOULD
DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCUR. FAILURE IN THE
REDUNDANT LOOP WOULD ALSO RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE,
SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS OF
FREON LEAKING INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS
EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (HYDRAULIC FLUID)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HX2
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHOULD A HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAIL, THE MISSION MUST BE TERMINATED,
SINCE TWO SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE END-OF-MISSION.
FAILURE IN ONE OF THE REMAINING SYSTEMS LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE. FOR THE ABORT CASE WITH AN SSME-OUT AND AN ENGINE
STUCK IN THE BUCKET, CREW AND VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IN RTLS DUE TO
DEGRADED PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
RESTRICTED FLOW (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HX2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE COMPONENT REDUCES THE COOLING
CAPABILITY FOR ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. LOSS OF SAID LOOP
REQUIRES ENTRY AT THE PRIMARY LANDING SITE. IF BOTH FREON
COOLANT LOOPS FAIL, CREW AND VEHICLE ARE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT
BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER
RESTRICTED FLOW (HYDRAULIC FLUID)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HXI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO HEAT HYDRAULIC FLUID IN ONE
SYSTEM USING THE HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER. HOWEVER, THIS
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CAN BE HEATED BY OPERATING MAIN PUMP OR
BARBECUING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1032 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21 TO GSE LINES)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HXl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING PRELAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING, THE FREON COOLANT LOOP (FCL)
LEAKS TO THE GSE LOOP. FOR ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS, FREON FROM THE
FCL BLEEDS TO 55 PSIG THROUGH THE GSE SERVICE LINE RELIEF VALVE.
THE FCL IS THEREFORE INOPERABLE DUE TO UNDERPRESSURIZATION AND
REQUIRES AN ENTRY AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND
FAILURE TO THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1033 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21 TO FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HXI
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR A FREON-TO-FREON LEAK, THE TWO COOLANT LOOPS WILL CONTINUE TO
FUNCTION AS ONE. DUE TO SAID INTERLOOP LEAK, ENTRY IS REQUIRED
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND, FREON LOOP FAILURE
(I.E.- EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE,
SINCE HEAT MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1034 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE HEAT EXCHANGERS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HXI
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE IN
THIS REDUNDANT LOOP WOULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS
OF FREON LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS
EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/8v
ATCS
1035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (GSE FREON)
LEAD ANALYST : W. E . PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HXl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING GROUND OPERATIONS, HEAT TRANSFERRED TO THE GSE LOOP FROM
THE FREON COOLANT LOOP IS REDUCED; HOWEVER, ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS
ARE NOT AFFECTED BY EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF GSE FREON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
RESTRICTED FLOW (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
56V63HXI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTION OF FREON FLOW FROM WITHIN THE GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
REDUCES THE HEAT TRANSFERRED FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP. WHEN THE
LOSS OF ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE
NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. IF BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS FAIL,
CREW AND VEHICLE WILL BE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED
FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/s7
ATCS
1037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 RESTRICTOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (02)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
02 RESTRICTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE 02 RESTRICTOR IS COVERED IN THE
ARPCS-150 LINES AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS. THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT
IN LOSS OF 02 REDUNDANCY AND THUS POSES A FIRE HAZARD. TOTAL
LOSS OF FUNCTION DEPRIVES CREW OF OXYGEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1038 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 RESTRICTOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
02 RESTRICTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE IN
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE. THE
EFFECTS OF FREON LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER,
IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1039 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON TO WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V61HX3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL LEAKAGE WITHIN THE ARS HEAT EXCHANGER RESULTS IN THE
MIXING OF THE DISSIMILIAR FLUIDS. UPON THE MIXING OF FREON AND
WATER, ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP AND ONE ARS WATER LOOP WILL BE
LOST. LOSS OF ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP AND ARS WATER LOOP
RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT
ARS OR FREON LOOPS RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-50
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON TO FREON)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/1R TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V61HX3
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING A FREON-TO-FREON LEAK, TWO COOLANT LOOPS WILL CONTINUE TO
FUNCTION AS ONE, WITH ENTRY REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING
SITE. A SECOND FAILURE, SUCH AS AN EXTERNAL LEAK, LEADS TO LOSS
OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED
FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/sv
ATCS
1041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/XR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WATER TO WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: M. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V61HX3
CAUSES: CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUE TO WATER LEAKAGE FROM ONE LOOP TO ANOTHER, THERE IS LOSS OF
WATER LOOP REDUNDANCY ALONG WITH REDUCED COOLING CAPABILITY
THROUGHOUT ARS. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THIS LOOP MAY RESULT IN A
POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
ALSO COVERED IN ARPCS-205 ANALYSIS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1042 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V61HX3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF FREON FROM A COOLANT LOOP REQUIRES THAT ENTRY BE
MADE AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO THE
REDUNDANT LOOP WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS OF FREON
LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO
HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1043
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: M. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: 40V61HX3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL WATER LEAKAGE ON THE HEAT EXCHANGER
RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE AFFECTED WATER COOLANT LOOP. TOTAL
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (NO WATER COOLANT LOOP) RESULTS IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALSO COVERED IN
ARPCS-208 ANALYSIS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1044 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
RESTRICTED FLOW (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V61HX3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTION OF FLOW WITHIN THE ARS INTERCHANGER REDUCES THE
COOLING CAPABILITY FOR ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. THEREFORE, ENTRY
IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. IF BOTH FREON
COOLANT LOOPS FAIL CREW AND VEHICLE WOULD BE LOST, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1045 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
RESTRICTED FLOW (WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V61HX3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTION OF WATER FLOW ON THE INTERCHANGER RESULTS IN LOSS OF
AFFECTED WATER COOLANT LOOP. TOTAL LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (NO WATER
COOLANT LOOP) RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE. THIS
FAILURE MODE IS ALSO COVERED IN ARS-205 ANALYSIS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY
40V63A6
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILED SENSOR ELIMINATES TEMPERATURE DATA FOR FREON ENTERING
THE ARS INTERCHANGER. REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA
WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1047 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW RATE SENSOR INTERCHANGER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
FLOW RATE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: 40V63A6-MT3, MT8
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT RESULTS IN UNRELIABLE FLOW RATE DATA ON FREON
ENTERING THE ARS. REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA
WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
1048 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21 TO P/L EXCHANGER FLUID)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL LEAKAGE BETWEEN A FREON COOLANT LOOP AND PAYLOAD COOLANT
LOOP RESULTS IN DEGRADED PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTIVE THERMAL
CONTROL SYSTEM. A DEGRADED FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT. A FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT FREON LOOP
LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW LIFE AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE
TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12187
ATCS
1049
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON-TO-FREON)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/iR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING A FREON-TO-FREON LEAK, TWO COOLANT LOOPS WILL CONTINUE TO
FUNCTION AS ONE. DUE TO SAID INTERLOOP LEAK, ENTRY IS REQUIRED
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE (I.E.-
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) OF THE LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW LIFE AND
VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1050 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOADHEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (P/L FLUID TO P/L FLUID)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL LEAKAGE IN THE HEAT EXCHANGER PROVIDES INADEQUATE
COOLING TO THE PAYLOAD ATCS AND WATER LOOP (OV-103 ONLY). IF THE
PAYLOAD REQUIRES BOTH ACTIVE COOLING LOOPS, THEN THE MISSION
OBJECTIVE WOULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE,
SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS
OF FREON LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS
EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE I1/24/87 C-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (P/L FLUID)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HXl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE CAUSES THE EFFECTED HEAT EXCHANGER TO
INADEQUATELY COOL. THE PAYLOAD COMPONENTS WHICH INTERFACE WITH
THE PAYLOAD ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS. THIS, IN TURN,
RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVE FOR THE ASSOCIATED
COMPONENTS THEREOF.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87
ATCS
1053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOADHEAT EXCHANGER
RESTRICTED FLOW (FREON 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E . PARKMAN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: 40V63HXl
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER REDUCES THE
COOLING CAPABILITY OF ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. IF LOSS OF ONE
FREON LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING
SITE. IF BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS FAIL, CREW AND VEHICLE
WOULD BE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-64
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1054 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW RATE SENSOR PAYLOAD HX
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
FLOW RATE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-MTI0-MTII
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT EFFECTS THE SENSOR, FLOW RATE DATA ON THE
FREON ENTERING THE PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER IS UNRELIABLE.
HOWEVER, REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH
COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/12187
ATCS
1055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SERVICING QUICK DISCONNECT CAP
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
PLUMBING
SERVICING QUICK DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GSE ECLSS/EPS SERVICING PANEL
40V63MD142
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE REDUNDANT CAP FOR THE DISCONNECT FAILS, DEPLETION OF FREON
FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP RESULTS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CONTAIN
FLUID IN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP, RESULTS IN ENTRY BEING REQUIRED
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1056 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-BI, B2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
DURING A DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS OF FREON
LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS TO HAVE NO
IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1057
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
FAILS IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY-AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V63-BI, B2
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE REDUCES THE
COOLING CAPABILITY FOR ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. FOR LOSS OF ONE
FREON LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
IF BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS FAIL, CREW AND VEHICLE WOULD BE
LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
FAILS IN THE PAYLOAD OR INTERCHANGER POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-BI, B2
CAUSES:
FAILURE
CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURES IN THE ARS WATER
LOOP OR PAYLOAD ATCS WATER LOOP BY CONTROLLING FLOW THROUGH THE
RESPECTIVE HEAT EXCHANGER. HOWEVER, TEMPERATURES MAY BE
CONTROLLED IN THE ARS LOOPS BY VARYING COMPONENT LOADS.
IF THE PAYLOAD REQUIRES THE FLOW CONTROL VALVES FOR BOTH LOOPS TO
BE IN THE PAYLOAD POSITION, MISSION OBJECTIVE MAY BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1059 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACTUATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE
ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-BI, B2
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURES IN THE ARS WATER
LOOP OR PAYLOAD ATCS WATER LOOP BY CONTROLLING FLOW THROUGH THE
RESPECTIVE HEAT EXCHANGER. TEMPERATURES MAY BE CONTROLLED IN THE
ARS LOOP BY VARYING COMPONENT LOADS. IF THE PAYLOAD
REQUIRES THE FLOW CONTROL VALVES TO BE IN THE PAYLOAD POSITION,
MISSION OBJECTIVE MAY BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-70
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
MID-BODY COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HX2, HX3, HX4, HX5, HX6
CAUSES:
STRESS
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING THE DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE IN
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER. EFFECTS OF FREON
LEAKING INTO THE MIDBODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO
HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C'71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1061 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY
40V63HX2, HX3, HX4, HX5, HX6
CAUSES: CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR A FREON-TO-FREON LEAK, TWO COOLANT LOOPS WILL CONTINUE TO
FUNCTION AS ONE. DUE TO THE INTERLOOP LEAK, ENTRY IS REQUIRED
THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE (I.E.-EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE) OF THE LOOPS LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD : W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HX2, HX3, HX4, HX5, HX6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE COLDPLATES REDUCES THE COOLING
CAPABILITY TO THE COLDPLATES FROM ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. THUS,
ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. HOWEVER, FOR
LOSS OF BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS, CREW AND VEHICLE WILL BE
LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1063 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE (AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW PRECEDING THE COLDPLATES REDUCES THE COOLING
CAPABILITY TO THE COLDPLATES FROM ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. FOR
LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY
LANDING SITE. FOR LOSS OF BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS, CREW
AND VEHICLE WOULD BE LOST, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM
THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i1/24/87 C-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1064 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AFT COLDPLATE NETWORK FLOWRATE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
FLOW RATE TRANSDUCER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63MTI3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED SENSOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF FLOWRATE DATA FOR FREON
ENTERING THE AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES. HOWEVER, REDUNDANT
PARALLEL SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED
SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1065
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63HX4, HX5, HX6
CAUSES:
STRESS
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DEPLETION OF FREON OCCURS FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-76
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1066
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63HX4, HX5, HX6
CAUSES: CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING A FREON-TO-FREON LEAK, TWO LOOPS WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION
AS ONE. DUE TO THIS INTERLOOP FREON LEAK, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT
THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE (i.e. - EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE) ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOOPS LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW
AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1067
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/iR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63HX4, HX5, HX6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE COMPONENT REDUCES THE CAPABILITY TO
COOL THE AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES. THIS LOSS OF COLDPLATE COOLING
REQUIRES ONLY AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. FOR LOSS OF BOTH
FREON COOLANT LOOPS, CREW AND VEHICLE WOULD BE LOST,
SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-78
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1068 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE (RGA COLDPLATES)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
RGA COLDPLATES
ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE WITHIN THE SYSTEM INHIBITS ADEQUATE FLOW TO EFFECTIVELY
COOL COLDPLATES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SECTION OF THE FREON COOLANT
LOOP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-79
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1069 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RGA COLDPLATES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
RGA COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HX7, HXS, HX9, HXI0
CAUSES: CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR A FREON-TO-FREON LEAK, TWO COOLANT LOOPS WILL CONTINUE TO
FUNCTION AS ONE. DUE TO THE INTERLOOP FREON LEAK, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE
(i.e. - EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOOPS LEADS TO LOSS
OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE
ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-80
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1070 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RGA COLDPLATES
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
RGA COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HX7, HX8, HX9, HXI0
CAUSES: CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO THE
REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT
CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-81
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
ATCS
1071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RGA COLDPLATES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
RGA COLDPLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63HX7, HXS, HX9, HXI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE WITHIN THE SYSTEM INHIBITS ADEQUATE FLOW TO EFFECTIVELY
COOL COLDPLATES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SECTION OF THE FREON COOLANT
LOOP. LOSS OF COLDPLATE COOLING REQUIRES AN ENTRY AT THE NEXT
PRIMARY LANDING SITE. FOR LOSS OF BOTH COLDPLATES COOLED
BY BOTH FREON COOLANT LOOPS, CREW AND VEHICLE WOULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-82
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/31/8v
ATCS
1072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREON LOOP LINES AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-83
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
ATCS
1073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKERS (FREON PUMP)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMPS A(B)
PANEL L4
CIRCUIT BREAKERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK, AREA 30
31V73A4 - CB19-27, CB39-41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAID FREON PUMP CAN BE STARTED AND OPERATED IN A DEGRADED MODE ON
THE TWO REMAINING PHASES. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POWER
THE PUMP MOTOR, FLOW IN THE FREON COOLANT LOOP WILL BE PROVIDED
BY THE REDUNDANT PUMP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-84
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1074 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH (FREON PUMPS)
FAILS TO REMAIN IN PUMP "A" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMPS A (B)
PANEL L4
PANEL LIA2 (SWITCH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK
31V73AIA2 - $23, $24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO SUPPLY POWER TO ONE FREON PUMP MOTOR.
IF THE REDUNDANT PUMP FAILS, FREON CANNOT BE CIRCULATED. LOSS OF
A FREON COOLANT LOOP, RESULTS IN THE REQUIRED ENTRY BEING AT NEXT
PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1075 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH (FREON PUMPS)
FAILS TO REMAIN IN PUMP "B" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMPS A (B)
PANEL L4
PANEL LIA2 (SWITCH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK
31V73AIA2-S23, $24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FREON PUMP MOTOR CANNOT BE MANUALLY COMMANDED "ON". IF PUMPS A
OR B CANNOT BE COMMANDED ON USING THE SWITCH OR GPC, ONE FREON
COOLANT LOOP IS LOST. FOR LOSS OF SAID COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
ATCS
1076
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH (FREON PUMPS)
FAILS IN PUMP "OFF" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMPS A (B)
PANEL L4
PANEL LIA2 (SWITCH)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK
31V73AIA2 - $23, $24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF LOSS OF BOTH PUMPS IN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1077 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (FREON PUMPS)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST : W. E • PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMPS A (B)
PANEL L4
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK
31V73AIA2 - A2RI9, A2R21, A2R23, A2R25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE STATUS OF FREON PUMP SWITCH POSITION IS LOST. HOWEVER,
SYSTEM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED
RESISTOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1078 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (FREON PUMPS)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMPS A (B)
PANEL L4
PANEL LIA2 ($23)
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK
31V73AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE STATUS OF FREON PUMP SWITCH POSITION IS LOST. HOWEVER,
SYSTEM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED
RESISTOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1079 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM BLOCKING DIODE (FREON PUMPS)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMP B
FCLA
DIODE (3A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6-CR; 82V76AI7-CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GPC IS UNABLE TO CONTROL PUMP B FOR ONE FREON LOOP BASED ON MAIN
BUS A VOLTAGE. IF BOTH PUMPS A AND B CANNOT BE STARTED, ONE
FREON COOLANT LOOP IS LOST. FOR LOSS OF A COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-90
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
ATCS
1080
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM BLOCKING DIODE (FREON PUMPS)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMP B
FCLA
DIODE (3A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6-CR; 82V76AI7-CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GPC CIRCUIT COULD BE DAMAGED DUE TO REVERSE CURRENT APPLIED
DURING GROUND TURNAROUND. GPC IS UNABLE TO CONTROL PUMP B FOR
ONE FREON LOOP BASED ON MAIN BUS A VOLTAGE. IF BOTH PUMPS A AND
B CANNOT BE STARTED, ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP IS LOST. FOR
LOSS OF A COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING
SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-91
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
ATCS
1081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
HYBRID DRIVER (FREON PUMPS)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMP B
FCLA
HYBRID DRIVER-TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6-AR; 82V76AI7-AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GPC IS UNABLE TO CONTROL PUMP B FOR ONE FREON LOOP BASED ON MAIN
BUS A VOLTAGE. IF BOTH PUMPS A AND B CANNOT BE STARTED, ONE
FREON COOLANT LOOP IS LOST. FOR LOSS OF A COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-92
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1082 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER (FREON PUMPS)
SHORTED, FAILS "ON"
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMP B
FCLA
HYBRID DRIVER-TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6-AR; 82V76AI7-AR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GPC IS UNABLE TO CONTROL PUMP B BASED ON MAIN BUS A VOLTAGE. IF
BOTH PUMPS A AND B CANNOT BE STARTED, ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP IS
LOST. FOR LOSS OF A COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT
PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE ii/24/87 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
ATCS
1083
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY SOLENOID (FREON PUMPS)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROLSYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMP B
MMCA
RELAY SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V76AII7-K76; 40V76118-K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GPC IS UNABLE TO CONTROL PUMP B FOR ONE FREON LOOP BASED ON MAIN
BUS A VOLTAGE. IF BOTH PUMPS A AND B CANNOT BE STARTED, ONE
FREON COOLANT LOOP IS LOST. FOR LOSS OF A COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-94
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1084 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY SOLENOID (FREON PUMPS)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FREON PUMP B
MMCA
RELAY SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V76AII7-K76; 40V76118-K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTANT VOLTAGE IS APPLIED TO FREON PUMP B.
MAY BE REMOVED BY OPENING CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
HOWEVER, POWER
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/o8/87
ATCS
1085
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON FLOW PROPORTIONING)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
PANEL L4
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73A4-CB42, CB45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS WITH FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE IN MID-
TRAVEL, ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP WILL BE LOST DUE TO BLOCKAGE. FOR
NO FLOW IN A FREON LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY
LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT LOOP LEADS
TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED
FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1086 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
FAILS WITH VALVE IN MID-TRAVEL POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S21, $22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS WITH FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE IN MID-
TRAVEL, ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP WILL BE LOST DUE TO BLOCKAGE. FOR
NO FLOW IN A FREON LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY
LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT LOOP LEADS
TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED
FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
ATCS
1087
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "INTERCHANGER" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA2-S21, $22
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURES IN THE ARS WATER LOOP OR
PAYLOAD ATCS WATER LOOP BY CONTROLLING FLOW THROUGH THE
RESPECTIVE HEAT EXCHANGER. HOWEVER, TEMPERATURES MAY BE
CONTROLLED BY VARYING COMPONENT LOADS IN THE ASSOCIATED LOOPS.
IF THE PAYLOAD REQUIRES THE FLOW CONTROL VALVES FOR BOTH LOOPS TO
BE IN THE PAYLOAD POSITION, MISSION OBJECTIVE MAY BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
ATCS
1088
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 21 (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "PAYLOAD HX" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S21, $22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURES IN THE ARS WATER LOOP OR
PAYLOAD ATCS WATER LOOP BY CONTROLLING FLOW THROUGH THE
RESPECTIVE HEAT EXCHANGER. HOWEVER, TEMPERATURES MAY BE
CONTROLLED BY VARYING COMPONENT LOADS IN THE ASSOCIATED LOOPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1089 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SIGNAL CONDITIONER (ATCS OF1)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY-AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V63AI2
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER COULD CAUSE VALVE TO
FAIL IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION AND RESTRICT THE FLOW OF ONE FREON
COOLANT LOOP. DUE TO VALVE BLOCKAGE. ENTRY IS REQUIRED AT THE
NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE
REDUNDANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-100
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1090 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A2RI7, A2R20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CANNOT BE SUPPLIED TO POSITION INDICATOR OR MDM FOR THE
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE. THE DOWNSTREAM FREON SENSORS INDICATE
VALVE POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-101
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/87
ATCS
1091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A2RI7, A2R20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OVERCURRENT WOULD DAMAGE THE CIRCUIT, WHICH WOULD REMOVE POWER
FROM POSITION INDICATOR OR MDM. THE DOWNSTREAM FREON SENSOR
INDICATE VALVE POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I02
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1092 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (INTERCHANGER)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
BLOCKING DIODE (INTERCHANGER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A2CRI. A2CR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CANNOT BE SUPPLIED TO FEEDBACK INDICATOR FOR THE FLOW
PROPORTIONING MODULE IN THE INTERCHANGER POSITION. THE
DOWNSTREAM FREON SENSORS INDICATE VALVE POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I03
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1093 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (INTERCHANGER)
SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
BLOCKING DIODE (INTERCHANGER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA2-A2CRI, A2CR3
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CANNOT BE SUPPLIED TO FEEDBACK INDICATOR FOR THE FLOW
PROPORTIONING MODULE IN THE INTERCHANGER POSITION. THE
DOWNSTREAM FREON SENSORS INDICATE VALVE POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I04
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
1094 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A2CR2, A2CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CANNOT BE SUPPLIED TO FEEDBACK INDICATOR FOR THE FLOW
PROPORTIONING MODULE IN THE PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER POSITION.
DOWNSTREAM FREON SENSORS INDICATE VALVE POSITION.
THE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I05
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1095 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA2-A2CR2, A2CR4
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CANNOT BE SUPPLIED TO FEEDBACK INDICATOR FOR THE FLOW
PROPORTIONING MODULE IN THE PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER POSITION.
DOWNSTREAM FREON SENSORS INDICATE VALVE POSITION.
THE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-i06
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
ATCS
1096
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "INTERCHANGER" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-DSI, DS2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA FROM MDM WILL INDICATE CORRECT POSITION OF THE FLOW
PROPORTIONING VALVE, REGARDLESS OF INDICATOR POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/8v
ATCS
1097
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "PAYLOAD HX" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA2-DSI, DS2
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA FROM MDM WILL INDICATE POSITION OF THE FLOW PROPORTIONING
VALVE, REGARDLESS OF INDICATOR POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-i08
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1098 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM INTERMEDIATE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
3) FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE
INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-DSI, DS2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA FROM MDM WILL INDICATE STATUS OF THE PROPORTIONING VALVE,
REGARDLESS OF INDICATOR POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I09
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/zs/sv
ATCS
1099
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL L4
CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73A4-CB43, CB46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN ELECTRICAL SURGE COULD REMOVE POWER FROM ONE OF THE ATCS OFI
SIGNAL CONDITIONER SECTIONS. LOSS OF A REDUNDANT SIGNAL
CONDITIONER SECTION LEADS TO LOSS OF MOST FREON COOLANT LOOP
SENSORS. CONDITION OF FREON CAN BE MONITORED WITHOUT THE USE
OF EITHER SECTION OF THE ATCS SIGNAL CONDITIONER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-If0
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
ii00 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL L4
CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73A4-CB43, CB46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO SUPPLY POWER FROM ONE OF THE ATCS OFI
SIGNAL CONDITIONER SECTIONS. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SIGNAL
CONDITIONER SECTION LEADS TO LOSS OF NINE FREON COOLANT SENSORS.
THE FREON COOLANT LOOP CAN BE MONITORED WITHOUT EITHER SECTION OF
THE ATCS SIGNAL CONDITIONER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-Ill
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
ATCS
ii01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH i0 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "OFF" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 017
SWITCH i0 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
33V73A17-SI0, SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF SENSOR DATA FOR: FCL 1 PAYLOAD HX FLOW RATE;
FCL 1 PUMP INLET PRESSURE; FCL 1 INTERCHANGER INLET TEMP (NOT
REDUNDANT); FCL 2 ACCUMULATOR QUANTITY; AND FCL 2 INTCHGR FLOW
RATE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT SIGNAL CONDITIONER LEADS TO LOSS OF
SEVERAL FREON COOLANT SENSORS. FREON COOLANT LOOP CAN BE
MONITORED WITHOUT EITHER SECTION OF THE ATCS SIGNAL CONDITIONER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7118187
ATCS
1102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH l0 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "A" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 017
SWITCH I0 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
33V73A17-SI0, SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATCS SIGNAL CONDITIONER (SECTION i) CAN ONLY BE POWERED BY AC2
PHASE B. IF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPERATE ONE SECTION OF THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONER FAILS, THEN SECOND SECTION OF CONDITIONER WILL
PROVIDE FREON COOLANT MEASUREMENTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
ll03 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH i0 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "B" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PAR/q4AN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 017
SWITCH I0 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
33V73AI7-SI0, SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATCS SIGNAL CONDITIONER (SECTION I) CAN ONLY BE POWERED BY AC2
PHASE B. IF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPERATE ONE SECTION OF THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONER FAILS, THEN SECOND SECTION OF CONDITIONER WILL
PROVIDE FREON COOLANT MEASUREMENTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/19/87
ATCS
1104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 4 (FREON)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM LOOP 1 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 01
SWITCH 4 (FREON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI-S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SWITCH FROM LOOP 1 (2) FREON FLOW RATE AND FLASH
EVAPORATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER SIGNALS TO LOOP 2 (I)
SIGNALS. HOWEVER, SYSTEM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES
FOR THE FAILED SWITCH.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/sv
ATCS
1105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREON FLOW VOLTMETER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 01
FREON FLOW VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
33V73AI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF INDICATION FOR LOOP 1 AND 2 FREON FLOW RATES.
SYSTEM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED
VOLMETER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
ATCS
1106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREON EVAPORATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE VOLTMETER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 01
FREON EVAPORATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
33V73AI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF INDICATION FOR LOOP 1 AND 2 FLASH EVAPORATOR
SYSTEM OUTLET TEMPERATURES. SYSTEM SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH
COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED VOLTMETER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
ATCS
1107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREON C&W LIGHT
FAILS TO SWITCH "ON" OR "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST : W. E . PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C
INSTRUMENTATION
C&W ELECTRONICS
PANEL F7A2
C&W LIGHT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A FAILURE TO INDICATE FREON LOOP 1 OR 2 OUT OF LIMIT
CONDITIONS. IF ALL CAUTION AND WARNING INDICATORS FOR THE FREON
SYSTEM ARE LOST, INDICATORS FROM INTERFACING SYSTEMS WILL
COMPENSATE FOR THE FAILURES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87
ATCS
2000
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
3) INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63TP229A, TP229B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2001 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63TP231
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-120
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87
ATCS
2002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLEX HOSES,MANIFOLDS, TUBES
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, TUBES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-121
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o5/87
ATCS
2003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-A20, A23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO COOL FREON BY THE RADIATOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVE, AND LEADS TO A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. FOR A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT LOOP THAT ELIMINATES VEHICLE
COOLING, THE ORBITER MUST ENTER AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 30
40V63-A20, A23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE FLOW CONTROL VALVE FAILS IN THE FULL FLOW POSITION, THE
BYPASS VALVE COULD BE USED TO CONTROL FREON TEMPERATURES. IN THE
CASE WHERE BOTH VALVES FAIL, AN UNDER TEMP OF FREON COULD OCCrTR
WHICH CAUSES THE LOSS OF A COOLANT LOOP AND A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87
ATCS
2005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-A20, A23
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP OCCURS, ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE
HEAT CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-124
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STEPPING MOTOR (FLOW CONTROL VALVE)
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
STEPPING MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-A20, A23
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, THERMAL
STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO COOL FREON BY THE RADIATOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVE, AND LEADS TO A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. FOR A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT LOOP THAT ELIMINATES VEHICLE
COOLING, THE ORBITER MUST ENTER AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2007 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE
FAILS IN BYPASS MODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
3) FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
BYPASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-AI9, A22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO COOL FREON BY THE RADIATOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVE, AND LEADS TO A MINUMUM DURATION FLIGHT. FOR A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT LOOP THAT ELIMINATES VEHICLE
COOLING, THE ORBITER MUST ENTER AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-126
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE
FAILS IN RADIATOR FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
BYPASS VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-AI9, A22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE BYPASS VALVE FAILS IN THE FULL FLOW POSITION, THE FLOW
CONTROL VALVE CAN BE USED TO CONTROL FREON TEMPERATURES. IN THE
CASE WHERE BOTH VALVES FAIL, AN UNDER TEMP OF FREON COULD OCCUR
WHICH LEADS TO LOSS OF A COOLANT LOOP AND A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o5/8v
ATCS
2009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
BYPASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-AI9, A22
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO THE
REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT
CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2010 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MOTOR (BYPASS VALVE)
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
BYPASS VALVE
MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-AI9, A22
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE FAILS IN THE BYPASS POSITION FREON CANNOT BE COOLED
BY THE RADIATOR WHICH RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVE, AND
LEADS TO A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. FOR A SECOND FAILURE IN THE
REDUNDANT LOOP THAT ELIMINATES VEHICLE COOLING, ORBITER
MUST ENTER AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87
ATCS
2011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MODE CONTROL VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD : W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
MODE CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP, ENTRY IS REQUIRED
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO THE
REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE, SINCE HEAT
CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-130
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6105187
ATCS
2012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), INTERNAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
MODE CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-A21, A24, A25, A26
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER IS LOST FOR ONE
FREON COOLANT LOOP. IF THERE IS LOSS OF BOTH CONTROLLERS, FREON
TEMPERATURE WITHIN ONE LOOP CANNOT BE AUTOMATICALLY ADJUSTED. IF
THE PAYLOAD REQUIRES PARTICIPATION BY ALL CREW MEMBERS,
THE MISSION OBJECTIVE IS LOST, SINCE ONE CREW MEMBER MUST
MANUALLY CONTROL FLOW IN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-131
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63MT30, MT32
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TRANSDUCER RESULTS IN LOSS OF INSIGHT ON TEMPERATURE OF
FREON ENTERING THE RADIATOR PANELS. REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM
TEMPERATURE SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED
SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87
ATCS
2014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
B)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (PANELS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY-AREA 40
40V63-MT28, MT29, MT31, MT33
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEMPERATURE DATA FOR FREON EXITING RADIATOR PANELS IS UNRELIABLE.
HOWEVER, REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM TEMPERATURE SENSORS PROVIDE DATA
WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/os/sv
ATCS
2015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
_)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY-AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V63A24MTI, A24MT2, A26MTI, A26MT2, A25MTI,
A25MT2, A21MTI, A21MT2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED SENSOR LEADS TO LOSS OF INPUT FOR ONE OF TWO RADIATOR
FLOW CONTROLLERS. IF THERE IS A LOSS OF REDUNDANT TEMPERATURE
SENSORS, FREON TEMPERATURE WITHIN ONE LOOP CANNOT BE
AUTOMATICALLY CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER 14 (FREON RADIATOR CONTROLLER)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
3) RADIATOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE
PANEL 015 (PNL 014)
CIRCUIT BREAKER 14 (CBI5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
33V73AI5- CBI4, CBI5; 33V73AI4-CBI4, CBI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SUPPLY POWER TO ONE OF TWO
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLERS FOR ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. IF A LOSS
OF BOTH FLOW CONTROLLERS OCCURS, FREON TEMPERATURE WITHIN ONE
LOOP CANNOT BE AUTOMATICALLY CONTROLLED. IF THE PAYLOAD
REQUIRES PARTICIPATION BY ALL CREW MEMBERS, MISSION OBJECTIVE IS
LOST, SINCE ONE CREW MEMBER MUST MANUALLY CONTROL FLOW IN ONE
FREON COOLANT LOOP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
71o8187
ATCS
2017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "OFF" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 26 (S27)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S26, $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF ONE OF TWO FLOW CONTROL VALVE MOTORS FOR ONE
FREON COOLANT LOOP. IF THERE IS A LOSS OF BOTH FLOW CONTROLLERS,
FREON TEMPERATURE WITHIN ONE LOOP CANNOT BE AUTOMATICALLY
CONTROLLED. IF THE PAYLOAD REQUIRES PARTICIPATION BY ALL
CREW MEMBERS, MISSION OBJECTIVE IS LOST, SINCE ONE CREW MEMBER
MUST MANUALLY CONTROL FLOW IN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM A (B) POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 26 (S27)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S26, $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INABILITY TO SWITCH TO REDUNDANT RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLERS
RESULTS. A SECOND FAILURE WHICH ELIMINATES THE ACTIVE CONTROLLER
RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION, DUE TO THE INABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY
CONTROL THE FREON TEMPERATURE WITHIN ONE COOLANT LOOP.
IF THE PAYLOAD REQUIRES PARTICIPATION BY ALL CREW MEMBERS,
MISSION OBJECTIVE IS LOST, SINCE ONE CREW MEMBER MUST MANUALLY
CONTROL FLOW IN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
71o8/87
ATCS
2019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST : W. E • PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4CRI, A4CR2, A4CR3, A4CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONTROL THE
BYPASS VALVE FOR ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. FOR LOSS OF SECOND FLOW
CONTROLLER, FREON TEMPERATURE WITHIN ONE LOOP CANNOT
AUTOMATICALLY BE CONTROLLED. IF THE PAYLOAD REQUIRES
PARTICIPATION BY ALL CREW MEMBERS, MISSION OBJECTIVE IS LOST,
SINCE ONE CREW MEMBER MUST MANUALLY CONTROL FLOW IN ONE FREON
COOLANT LOOP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/87
ATCS
2020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4CRI, A4CR2, A4CR3, A4CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
BOTH FLOW CONTROL VALVE STEPPING MOTORS OPERATE AT THE SAME TIME.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CONTROL THE BYPASS VALVE IN ONE FREON
LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CONTROL THE RATE OF FREON
EXITING THE RADIATOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/87
ATCS
2021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A4R8
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4RI, A4R2, A4R3, A4R4, A4RS, A4R6, A4R7,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF SWITCH POSITION FEEDBACK TO MDM RESULTS. HOWEVER,
SENSORS WITHIN THE FREON COOLANT LOOP PROVIDE DATA WHICH
COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED RESISTOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-140
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
VlOSlSV
ATCS
2022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4RI, A4R2, A4R3, A4R5, A4R6, A4R7, A4R8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF SWITCH POSITION FEEDBACK TO MDM RESULTS. HOWEVER,
SENSORS WITHIN THE FREON COOLANT LOOP PROVIDE DATA WHICH
COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED RESISTOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
VlOSlSV
ATCS
2023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 25 (RADIATOR CONTROL OUTLET TEMPERATURE)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "NORM" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 25
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY ADJUST THE
STEPPING MOTOR WHICH CONTROLS THE RADIATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE BY
VARYING THE AMOUNT OF FREON EXITING THE RADIATOR. LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL THE RATE OF FREON EXITING THE RADIATORS FOR
BOTH LOOPS RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-142
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
71o8187
ATCS
2024
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 25 (RADIATOR CONTROL OUTLET TEMPERATURE)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM "HI" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 25
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY ADJUST THE
STEPPING MOTOR WHICH CONTROLS THE RADIATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE BY
VARYING THE AMOUNT OF FREON EXITING THE RADIATOR. LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO THE RATE OF FREON EXITING THE RADIATORS FOR BOTH
LOOPS RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2025 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER (RADIATOR BYPASS VLV)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
PANEL L4
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73A4-CBI28, CB129, CB44, CB47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE OF THE RADIATOR
BYPASS VALVE MOTORS FOR ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO CONTROL BYPASS VALVE FOR ONE LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO CONTROL THE RATE OF FREON EXITING THE RADIATOR
THIS LEADS TO LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/s7
ATCS
2026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
FAILS IN "RADIATOR FLOW" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S29, $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF MANUAL CAPABILITY TO POSITION BYPASS VALVE;
HOWEVER, SWITCHING FROM BYPASS TO RADIATOR FLOW CAN BE DONE USING
EITHER CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE BYPASS
VALVE WITHIN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF
MISSION, SINCE FREON TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE iI/24/87 C-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 /15/87
ATCS
2027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
FAILS IN "BYPASS" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S29, $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF MANUAL CAPABILITY TO POSITION BYPASS VALVE;
HOWEVER, SWITCHING FROM BYPASS TO RADIATOR FLOW CAN BE DONE USING
EITHER CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE BYPASS
VALVE WITHIN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF
MISSION, SINCE FREON TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87
C-146 __
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
FAILS IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S9, $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF MANUAL CAPABILITY TO POSITION BYPASS VALVE;
HOWEVER, SWITCHING FROM BYPASS TO RADIATOR FLOW CAN BE DONE USING
EITHER CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE BYPASS
VALVE WITHIN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF
MISSION, SINCE FREON TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-147 •
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (PRECEDES S35)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
3) RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
4) PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR (PRECEDES S35)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4R21, A4R22, A4R23, A4R24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL ONE OF THE BYPASS VALVE
MOTORS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE BYPASS VALVE
WITHIN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF MISSION, SINCE
FREON TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-148
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
2030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (PRECEDES S35)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR (PRECEDES S35)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4R21, A4R22, A4R23, A4R24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL ONE OF THE BYPASS VALVE
MOTORS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE BYPASS VALVE
WITHIN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF MISSION, SINCE
FREON TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-149
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/15/87
ATCS
2031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 35 (RADIATOR CONTROLLER BYPASS VALVE)
FAILS IN THE "AUTO" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 35 (RADIATOR CONTROLLER BYPASS VALVE)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S35, $36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF MANUAL CAPABILITY TO POSITION BYPASS VALVE;
HOWEVER, SWITCHING FROM BYPASS TO RADIATOR FLOW CAN BE DONE USING
EITHER CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE BYPASS
VALVE WITHIN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF
MISSION, SINCE FREON TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-150
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/15/sv
ATCS
2032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 35 (RADIATOR CONTROLLER BYPASS VALVE)
FAILS IN THE "MANUAL" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 35 (RADIATOR CONTROLLER BYPASS VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30
31V73AIA2-S35, $36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY CONTROL BYPASS VALVE
MOTORS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE BYPASS VALVE
WITHIN ONE FREON COOLANT LOOP LEADS TO LOSS OF MISSION, SINCE THE
FREON TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/is/By
ATCS
2033
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
MPCA
HYBRID DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY - AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V76A25-AR46, AR47, 40V76A26-AR38; 40V76A27-AR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL ONE OF THE BYPASS VALVE MOTORS
RESULTS. HOWEVER, BYPASS VALVE MAY BE CONTROLLED BY THE RADIATOR
CONTROLLERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
ATCS
2034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER
SHORTED, FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE
MPCA
HYBRID DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY - AREA 40
40V76A25-AR46, AR47; 40V76A26-AR38, 40V76A27-AR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL ONE OF THE BYPASS VALVE MOTORS
RESULTS. HOWEVER, BYPASS VALVE MAY BE CONTROLLED BY THE RADIATOR
CONTROLLERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-153
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/10/87
ATCS
2035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR A4RI9 (A4R20)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4RI9, A4R20
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN RESISTOR IS UNABLE TO SUPPLY CURRENT FOR FEEDBACK TO MDMS
AND PANEL INDICATOR, WHICH PROVIDE BYPASS VALVE POSITION FOR ONE
FREON COOLANT LOOP. HOWEVER, REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM TEMPERATURE
SENSORS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED
INDICATOR AND MDM FEEDBACKS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-154
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/lO/87
ATCS
2036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR A4RI9 (A4R20)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4RI9, A4R20
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OVERCURRENT IN THE CIRCUIT COULD DAMAGE MDMS AND THE PANEL
INDICATOR. HOWEVER, REDUNDANT DOWNSTREAM TEMPERATURE SENSORS
PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED INDICATOR AND MDMS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/lO/87
ATCS
2037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR)
OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
DIODE (A4CR5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA2-A4CR5, A4CR6, A4CR7, A4CR8
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF PANEL INDICATOR DUE TO INABILITY TO PASS
CURRENT THROUGH THE COMPENTENT. HOWEVER, REDUNDANT MDMS PROVIDE
DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED INDICATOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-156
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/lO/87
ATCS
2038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
DIODE (A4CR5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4CR5, A4CR6, A4CR7, A4CR8
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE INDICATOR WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE; HOWEVER, FEEDBACK TO THE
MDMS WILL INCORRECTLY INDICATE THAT THE VALVE IS IN BOTH THE
BYPASS AND RADIATOR POSITIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/10/87
ATCS
2039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY EPD&C
RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER
PANEL LIA2
BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-DS3, DS4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS A LOSS OF FLIGHT DECK PANEL INDICATION. HOWEVER,
REDUNDANT MDMS PROVIDE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES FOR THE FAILED
INDICATOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-158
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/13/87
ATCS
3000
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY - HI LOAD FEEDLINE
PART NUMBER: PRIMARY: V63TI895A (50V63MT44).
V63TI896A (50V63MT45).
SECONDARY:
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR FAILURE WILL CAUSE INCORRECT DATA DISPLAY ON SM DISPLAY.
CREW/GROUND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES CAN ISOLATE PROBLEM TO FAILED
SENSOR. NO IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS. SENSORS ARE ONLY
APPLICABLE ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, FR); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87
ATCS
3001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD FEEDLINE FROM CUT-OFF TO NOZZLE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE IN THE FEEDLINE DEDICATED TO THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE INPUTS OF THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR.
BLOCKAGE OF BOTH FEEDLINES RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE HI LOAD
EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR MEANS LOSS OF
MISSION AND ENTRY TO NEXT PLS. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR
COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP MAY MEAN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
3002 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD FEEDLINE FROM CUT OFF TO NOZZLE (PLUMBING)
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE IN THE HI LOAD FEEDLINE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ENTIRE
FEEDLINE IF LEAK IS UPSTREAM OF VALVES OR LOSS OF 1/2 OF HI LOAD
IF LEAK IS DOWNSTREAM OF VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
STILL RESULT IN RETURN AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE
OPPORTUNITY DUE TO LOSS OF HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF HIGH
LOAD COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE HEATER
LOSS OF OUTPUT, NO HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63HR36 CONNECTIONS 1 & 2, HTR 2-
50V63HR36 CONNECTIONS 3 & 4. FDLN B: HTR 1-50V63HR42
CONNECTIONS 1 & 2, HTR 2-50V63HR42 CONNECTIONS 3 & 4
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A HEATER FAILED OFF IN THE VICINITY OF THE HI LOAD VALVES COULD
AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE VALVES/NOZZLES. THEREFORE, A HEATER
FAILURE WILL, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, REQUIRE THE USE OF THE ALTERNATE
SET OF HEATERS. LOSS OF BOTH SETS OF HEATERS MAY MEAN
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR AND ENTRY TO NEXT PRIMARY
LANDING SITE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE
FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF THE CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL) ; SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-162
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILS CLOSED (REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63S45, HTR 2-50V63S47.
HTR 1-50V63S42, HTR 2-50V63S50.
FLDN B:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILED CLOSED (REFLECTING A LOW TEMPERATURE) IS THE
SAME AS A HEATER FAILED ON. HEATERS FAILED ON CAN CAUSE OVERTEMP
SITUATIONS.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87
ATCS
3005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILS OPEN - REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63S45, HTR 2-50V63S47.
HTR 2-50V63S42, HTR 2-50V63S50
FLDN B:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILED OPEN (REFLECTING A HIGH TEMPERATURE) IS THE
SAME AS A HEATER FAILED OFF. BECAUSE OF THE HEATERS LOCATION,
ITS OPERATION COULD AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WATER
VALVE/SPRAY NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF ALL THERMOSTATS AND
HEATERS WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR AND
ENTRY TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL) ; SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-164
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/11/87
ATCS
3006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
40 MICRON FILTER-HI LOAD WATER VALVE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE - HI LOAD FEEDWATER SYSTEM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FILTER IS PRESENT IN EACH FEEDWATER VALVE/NOZZLE ASSEMBLY ON
BOTH EVAPORATORS. IF A BLOCKAGE OCCURS, THAT VALVE/NOZZLE
ASSEMBLY WILL BE NON-FUNCTIONAL. SHOULD ALL FILTERS BE BLOCKED,
BOTH FESs WILL BE LOST RESULTING IN A RETURN AT NEXT PRIMARY
LANDING SITE OPPORTUNITY. LOSS OF BOTH FESs COMBINED WITH THE
LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3007 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE - HI LOAD FEEDWATER SYSTEM
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION,
INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE IS DESIGNED TO PULSE OPEN
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE PULSER VALVE. IF THE ISOLATION VALVE IS
FAILED OPEN, A CONTINUOUS STREAM OF WATER WILL GO TO THE PULSER
VALVE WHICH COULD, IN TURN ALLOW EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS OF WATER INTO
THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR CORE. THIS WATER COULD RESULT IN FREEZING
AND ICING OF THE EVAPORATOR CORE MEANING THE LOSS OF THE HI LOAD
EVAPORATOR. (ADDITIONALLY, UNLESS THE FLOW IS CUT OFF FROM
ANOTHER LOCATION, IT COULD RESULT IN A DEPLETION OF THE
SUPPLY WATER TANK.) LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD COMBINED WITH A LOSS
OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935; CSD-SH-126; VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ,
60FR) ; SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-166
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NORMALLY CLOSED ISOLATION VALVE (NORMALLY PULSED OPEN AT THE
SAME FREQUENCY AS THE PULSER VALVE) FAILURE TO OPEN WILL RESULT
IN NO WATER GETTING TO THE SPRAY NOZZLE AND TO THE HI LOAD
EVAPORATOR. A LOSS OF BOTH ISOLATION VALVES MEANS A LOSS OF THE
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR AND ENTRY AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS
OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON
LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FR); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
2; CSD-SH-126
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3009 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD PULSER VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE - HI LOAD EVAPORATOR INPUT LINES
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NORMALLY CLOSED PULSER VALVES ARE PULSED OPEN AT A VARIABLE
FREQUENCY DEPENDING UPON THERMAL REQUIREMENTS AND HEAT LOADS. IF
IT FAILS CLOSED, NO WATER WILL GET TO THE SPRAY NOZZLE. LOSS OF
BOTH PULSER VALVES WILL RESULT LOSS OF HI LOAD EVAP AND
ENTRY TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ) ; CSD-SH-126; SSSH 7.3
SHEETS 1 & 2; JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3010 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD PULSER VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE - HI LOAD FEEDLINE
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PULSER VALVE IS DESIGNED TO BE PULSED OPEN AT THE SAME
FREQUENCY AS THE HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE. IF THE PULSER VALVE
FAILS OPEN AND THE ISOLATION VALVE OPERATES CORRECTLY, THIS
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
ISOLATION VALVE MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
EVAPORATOR AND LANDING AT NEXT PLS. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FP); CSD-SH-126; SSSH 7.3
SHEETS 1 & 2; JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD SPRAY NOZZLES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE - HI LOAD FEEDLINE
CAUSES: THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ICING WOULD CAUSE A BLOCKAGE IN THE SPRAY NOZZLE OF THE HI LOAD
EVAPORATOR AND NO WATER INTRODUCED INTO THE EVAPORATOR. A LOSS
OF BOTH SPRAY NOZZLE MEANS A LOSS OF THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR AND
ENTRY TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FP); CSD-SH-126; SSSH 7.3
SHEETS 1 & 2; JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/15/87
ATCS
3012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR CORE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK IN THE EVAPORATOR CORE WOULD RESULT IN A MIXING OF THE
FREON 21 AND WATER. WORST CASE WOULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE
EVAPORATOR AND THE LEAKING FREON LOOP. FLIGHT RULES CALL FOR A
PRIORITY FLIGHT FOR LEAKS BETWEEN DISSIMILAR FLUIDS. THE SIZE OF
THE LEAK MUST BE CONSIDERED SINCE A LEAK COULD MEAN THE LOSS OF
THE ASSOCIATED FREON LOOP. A LOSS OF A FREON LOOP MEANS AN ENTRY
AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE - NOT SIMPLY A MINIMUM DURATION
FLIGHT. LOSS OF THE FREON LOOP AND LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
CAN MEAN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: CSD-SH-126; JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3013 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE
INTERNAL RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MOUNTING PLATE IS A PIN FIN HEAT EXCHANGER WHICH SERVES TO
MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TEMPERATURE TO PREVENT FREEZING OF
THE NOZZLES. RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON COULD ALLOW FREEZE-UP AND
LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR
COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN MEAN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-172
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3014 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK IN THE VALVE MOUNTING PLATE ALLOWS MIXING OF WATER AND
FREON 21. A LEAK, IN A HEAT EXCHANGER, BETWEEN DISSIMILAR FLUIDS
CAUSES A PRIORITY FLIGHT BY FLIGHT RULES. THE SIZE OF THE LEAK
MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, HOWEVER, SINCE A LARGE
ENOUGH LEAK COULD MEAN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED FREON LOOP.
LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CHANGES THE FLIGHT RULE FROM INVOKING A
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT TO ENTERING AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING
SITE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH LOSS
OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87
ATCS
3015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR DUE TO A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
VALVE MOUNTING PLATE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR COMBINED
WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102; JSC-19935; SSSH 7.3
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-174
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87
ATCS
3016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE (ACOD)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON TO WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACOD IS A PIN FIN TYPE HEAT EXCHANGER WHICH PREVENTS
UNEVAPORATED WATER DROPLETS FROM ENTERING THE STEAM DUCT. A LEAK
IN THE ACOD WILL RESULT IN A MIXTURE OF DISSIMILAR HEAT EXCHANGER
FLUIDS (FREON-21 AND WATER). FLIGHT RULES DICTATE A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT. THE LEAK CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF BOTH HIGH LOAD
EVAPORATOR AND ONE FREON LOOP WITH SUBSEQUENT POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102; JSC-19935; SSSH 7.3
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87
ATCS
3017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL LEAK IN THE ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF FREON WITHIN ONE COOLANT LOOP. LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP
MEANS LANDING AT NEXT PLS. LOSS OF FREON LOOP COMBINED WITH LOSS
OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102; JSC-19935; SSHH 7.3
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-176
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE
NO FLOW OF FREON
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACOD IS A PIN FIN TYPE HEAT EXCHANGER WHICH REDUCES THE
PERCENTAGE OF WATER DROPLETS IN THE EXIT DUCT BY PROVIDING AN
ADDITIONAL HOT SURFACE FOR EVAPORATION. A FAILURE WHICH RESULTS
IN NO FLOW OF FREON THRU THE ACOD WOULD MEAN MORE WATER DROPS IN
THE EXIT DUCT.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-177
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3019 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT : 2/IR ATO : 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE HI LOAD EXIT DUCT CARRIES THE STREAM FROM THE HI LOAD
EVAPORATOR TO THE SONIC NOZZLE FOR DUMPING OVERBOARD. AN
EXTERNAL LEAK WOULD RESULT IN WATER VAPOR BEING INTRODUCED INTO
THE AFT FUSELAGE. SINCE ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT/WIRE BUNDLES IN THE
AFT FUSELAGE ARE SEALED, THIS SHOULD NOT CAUSE A PROBLEM EXCEPT
IN THE CASE OF A SECONDARY FAILURE OF THE SEALING SYSTEM. THIS
LEAK MAY REQUIRE THAT THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR BE SHUT DOWN WITH
A LANDING AT THE NEXT PLS. A LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD COMBINED
WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3020 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT
NO FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 2/IR
2/2 TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/1R
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A RESTRICTION IN THE HI LOAD EXIT DUCT PREVENTING FLOW OF STEAM
THRU THE HI LOAD EXIT DUCT MEANS THAT THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR IS
NO LONGER AVAIALBLE. THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR CALLS
FOR AN ENTRY TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF THE
HIGH LOAD COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN
THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
3021 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
AND B
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DUCT HEATERS - ZONE A
LOSS OF OUTPUT, NO HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ZONE A AND B - HI LOAD EVAP DUCT; AFT FUSELAGE
50V63HR28 , 50V63HR29
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION,
OVERVOLTAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF ALL THREE DUCT HEATERS IN EACH ZONE CAN RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR AND SUBSEQUENT ENTRY TO NEXT
PLS. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON
LOOP MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FM); SSSH 7.3 SHEET i OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/26/07
ATCS
3022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
MONITOR
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DUCT TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ZONE A - HI LOAD DUCT; AFT FUSELAGE
50V63MTI7A, 50V63MT36 (V63TI820A, V63TI821A)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM THE TEMPERATURE SENSOR WILL RESULT IN
INCORRECT MONITORING DATA. THE CREW/GROUND CAN ISOLATE FAILURE
TO SENSOR FAILURE AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION WITH NO FURTHER
IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FP); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-181
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/2v/sv
ATCS
3023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
THERMOSTATS
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DUCT HEATER
FAILS OPEN - REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ZONE A AND B - HI LOAD DUCT; AFT FUSELAGE
HEATER CONTROLLERS FOR 50V63HR28 AND 50V63HR29
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILED REFLECTING A HIGH TEMPERATURE IS EQUIVALENT
TO A HEATER FAILED OFF. A SINGLE THERMOSTAT FAILURE WILL RESULT
IN A "LOCAL" UNDERTEMP SITUATION. A FAILURE OF ALL THERMOSTATS
WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE HI LOAD DUCT, THE LOSS OF
THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR, AND ENTRY TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP
CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FM) ; SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3024 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
THERMOSTATS
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DUCT HEATER
FAILS CLOSED - REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ZONE A AND B - HI LOAD DUCT; AFT FUSELAGE
HEATER CONTROLLERS FOR 50V63HR28 AND 50V63HR29
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT REFLECTING A LOW TEMPERATURE IS EQUIVALENT TO A
STUCK ON HEATER. A SINGLE THERMOSTAT FAILURE OF THIS TYPE WILL
RESULT IN A LOCAL OVERTEMP SITUATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FM); SSSH 7.3 SHEET i OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/oiis7
ATCS
3025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD NOZZLE HEATER
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION: HI LOAD NOZZLE; AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: HEATER A: 50V63A27HR21; HEATER B:
HEATER C: 50V63A27HR3
50V63A27HR2;
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HI LOAD NOZZLE HEATER IS ENABLED WHEN REQUIRED - NORMALLY
DURING DEORBIT PREP. IF THE HEATER FAILS OFF, THE HI LOAD NOZZLE
MAY ICE UP RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF THE NOZZLE, THE LOSS OF THE
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR, AND ENTRY TO NEXT PLS. LOSS OF THE
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FM, 60FP); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE II/24/87 C-184
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3026 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR/HEATER
CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HI LOAD NOZZLE; AFT FUSELAGE
50V63A27 NOZZLE ASSEMBLY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HI LOAD NOZZLE HEATERS ARE CONTROLLED BY AN ARRANGEMENT OF A
TEMPERATURE SENSOR, A RESISTANCE BRIDGE, AND A TEMPERATURE
CONTROLLER. A FAILURE IN ANY OF THESE COMPONENTS WHICH RESULT IN
A HIGH TEMPERATURE BEING REFLECTED WILL HAVE THE SAME EFFECT.
A HIGH REFLECTED TEMPERATURE IS EQUIVALENT TO A HEATER FAILED
OFF. A LOSS OF ALL NOZZLE HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLIES WILL RESULT
IN POSSIBLE FREEZE-UP OF THE NOZZLE, A LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
EVAPORATOR, AND ENTRY TO NEXT PLS. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN
THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FM, 60FP); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR/HEATER
CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HI LOAD NOZZLE; AFT FUSELAGE
50V63A27 NOZZLE ASSEMBLY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HI LOAD NOZZLE HEATERS ARE CONTROLLED BY AN ARRANGEMENT OF A
TEMPERATURE SENSOR, A RESISTANCE BUDGE, AND A TEMPERATURE
CONTROLLER. A FAILURE IN ANY OF THESE COMPONENTS WHICH RESULTS
IN A LOW TEMPERATURE BEING REFLECTED WILL HAVE THE SAME EFFECT
AND BE EQUIVALENT TO A HEATER STUCK ON.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FM, 60FP); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-186
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/27/8v
ATCS
3028
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD DUCT NOZZLE TEMPERATURE MONITOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HI LOAD NOZZLE; AFT FUSELAGE
50V63MT37 (V63TI890A)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM A SENSOR WILL RESULT IN INCORRECT SM DATA
AND FALSE ALARMS. CREW/GROUND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES WILL
ISOLATE THE PROBLEM TO A FAILED SENSOR WITH NO IMPACT ON FUTURE
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FP); SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-187
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD NOZZLE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HI LOAD NOZZLE - AFT FUSELAGE
50V63TP268
CAUSES: ICING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A BLOCKAGE OF THE HIGH LOAD NOZZLE MEANS NO FLOW THRU THE NOZZLE,
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR AND ENTRY AT NEXT PLS. LOSS OF
THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP
CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-188
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI LOAD NOZZLE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LA/_DING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE FROM THE HI LOAD SONIC NOZZLE INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE. ALL
COMPONENTS IN THE AFT FUSELAGE ARE COMPLETELY SESALED. HOWEVER,
WORST CASE OF A LEAK IN THIS AREA WILL REQUIRE SHUTTING DOWN THE
HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR AND LANDING AT NEXT PLS. A LOSS
OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON
LOOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3031 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER
NO HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: 50V63HR34; FDLN B: 50V63HR40; HTR I-
CONNECTIONS 1 AND 2; HTR 2-CONNECTIONS 3 AND 4
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A HEATER WHICH FAILS OFF WILL RESULT IN LOWER TEMPERATURE WATER
BEING INTRODUCED INTO THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND POSSIBLE IN THE
FEEDLINE. WORST CASE IS A LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR WHICH
MEANS A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-190
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87
ATCS
3032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILS CLOSED - REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63S44, HTR2-50V63S46; FLDN B:
HTR 1-50V63S48, HTR 2-50V63S50
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILING REFLECTING A LOW TEMPERATURE IS EQUIVALENT
TO A HEATER FAILING ON. THE RESULT WILL BE AN OVERTEMP SITUATION
AND LOSS OF THE HEATER DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF THE HEATER
CONTROL. WORST CASE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-191
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3033 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILS OPEN - REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63S44; HTR 2-50V63S46.
HTR 1-50V63S48; HTR 2-50V63S50.
FDLN B:
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILED REFLECTING A HIGH TEMPERATURE IS EQUIVALENT
TO A HEATER FAILING OFF. THE RESULT WILL BE AN UNDERTEMP
SITUATION WITH A LOWER TEMPERATURE FLUID BEING DELIVERED TO THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR, POSSIBLE ICING IN EITHER THE FEEDLINE OR THE
NOZZLE AND LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-192
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
3034 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
(V63TI893A) .
AFT FUSELAGE
FDLN A: 50V63MT40 (V63TI891A). FLDN B: 50V63MT42
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM THE TEMPERATURE SENSOR WILL RESULT IN
INCORRECT DATA BEING DISPLAYED ON SM DISPLAY AND SPURIOUS ALARMS.
CREW/GROUND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES CAN ISOLATE THE PROBLEM TO A
FAILED SENSOR WITH NO IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FQ, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-193
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3035 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FILTER
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE ASSEMBLY-40 MICRON
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTI_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE IN THE FILTER WILL RESTRICT THE FLOW THRU THE WATER
VALVES/NOZZLES AND INTO THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF BOTH
FILTERS, MEANS LOSS OF BOTH TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINES LOSS OF
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR, AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-194
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3036 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE REMAINS OPEN DURING ALL
TOPPING EVAPORATOR OPERATIONS. THIS HAS NO AFFECT ON FUTURE
OPERATIONS SINCE "OPEN" IS THE NORMAL POSITION OF THE VALVE
DURING OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
1 OF 2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), JSC-19935, SSSH 7.3 SHEET
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03187
ATCS
3037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE NORMALLY REMAINS OPEN
DURING ALL TOPPING EVAPORATOR OPERATIONS. THE VALVE FAILING
CLOSED MEANS THE FEEDLINE PATH INTO THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR IS NO
LONGER AVAILABLE. LOSS OF BOTH TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION
VALVES MEANS THE LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-196
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87
ATCS
3038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
VALVE/NOZZLE
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF
PULSER FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PULSER VALVE FAILING CLOSED IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS
LOSS OF THAT FEEDLINE/NOZZLE COMBINATION. BOTH PULSER VALVES
FAILING CLOSED MEANS LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES:
1 OF 2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FL), JSC-19935, SSSH 7.3 SHEET
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-197
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3039 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
VALVE/NOZZLE
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF
PULSER FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINCE THE TOPPING ISOLATION VALVE REMAINS OPEN DURING ALL TOPPING
EVAPORATOR OPERATIONS, THE PULSER/SHUTOFF VALVE FAILING OPEN WILL
RESULT IN A LARGE AMOUNT OF WATER BEING INTRODUCED INTO THE
EVAPORATOR CORE. THIS MEANS POSSIBLE ICING IN THE CORE/EXIT
DUCT, LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND AN MDF.
REFERENCES:
1 OF 2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FL), JSC-19935, SSSH 7.3 SHEET
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-198
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
VALVE/NOZZLE
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF
RESTRICTED FLOW IN NOZZLE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE INPUT NOZZLE TO THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR IF BOTH NOZZLES ARE LOST. BY
FLIGHT RULES, THIS MEANS A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. BY THE
MISSION SPECIFIC GUIDELINES, IT ALSO MEANS A LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO REQUIRED ATTITUDE AND POWER LEVEL CHANGES.
REFERENCES:
1 OF 2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FL), JSC-19935, SSSH 7.3 SHEET
REPORT DATE i1/24/87 C-199
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3041 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE
NO FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF BOTH FEEDLINES ARE BLOCKED, NO FLOW THRU THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
ATCS
3042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE FROM THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE COMPARTMENT WILL RESULT, WORST CASE, IN A LOSS OF THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS A
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
ATCS
3043
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE FROM THE ISOLATION VALVE INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE. THIS
RESULTS, WORST CASE, IN A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT DUE TO LOSS OF
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR.
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-202
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
ATCS
3044
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
VALVE/NOZZLE
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE FROM THE VALVE INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE RESULTING IN A LOSS
OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87
ATCS
3045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
PLATE
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING
NO FLOW OF FREON
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MOUNTING PLATE IS A PIN FIN HEAT EXCHANGER WHICH SERVES TO
MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TEMPERATURE TO PREVENT FREEZING OF
THE NOZZLES. RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON COULD ALLOW FREEZE-UP AND
LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR
REQUIRES A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-204
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6105187
ATCS
3046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
PLATE
FAILURE MODE :
TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING
LEAK BETWEEN WATER/FREON
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
3 ) TOPPING EVAPORATOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK BETWEEN THE WATER AND FREON IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR
WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING PLATE WILL RESULT IN A PRIORITY
FLIGHT, BY FLIGHT RULES. LOSS OF THE FREON LOOP COMBINED WITH
EITHER A LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR OR LOSS OF THE SECOND
FREON LOOP CAN MEAN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-205
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT : i/1
3047 ABORT : i/1
ITEM:
PLATE
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT : I/1 AOA : i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE WATER VALVE/NOZZLE PLATE WOULD RESULT
IN A TOTAL LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A BREAK IN THE
FREON COOLANT LOOP. THIS MEANS A LOSS OF THE TWO FREON LOOPS.
REFERENCES: JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-206
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87
ATCS
3048
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF FREON
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A INTERNAL LEAK OF FREON INTO THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE RESULTS
IN A LEAK BETWEEN DISSIMILAR FLUIDS AND A PRIORITY FLIGHT. IF
LEAK CAUSES LOSS OF THE FREON LOOP, THEN LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE CAN
RESULT WITH A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF EITHER THE SECOND
FREON LOOP OR THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), JSC-19935, SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3049 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE
RESTRICTED FLOW (WATER)
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: ICING, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ICING WITHIN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND PROBABLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO ATTITUDE
AND POWER LEVEL ADJUSTMENTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), JSC-19935, SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-208
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o8/87
ATCS
3050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE
RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
3 ) TOPPING EVAPORATOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACOD IS A PIN FIN TYPE HEAT EXCHANGER WHICH REDUCES THE
PERCENTAGE OF WATER DROPLETS IN THE EXIT DUCT BY PROVIDING AN
ADDITIONAL HOT SURFACE FOR EVAPORATION. A FAILURE WHICH RESULTS
IN NO FLOW OF FREON THRU THE ACOD WOULD MEAN MORE WATER DROPS IN
THE EXIT DUCT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/08/87
ATCS
3051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATORANTI CARRYOVERDEVICE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF FREON
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF FREON FROM THE ACOD RESULTS IN A LEAK BETWEEN
DISSIMILAR FLUIDS AND A PRIORITY FLIGHT. IF LEAK CAUSES LOSS OF
THE FREON LOOP, A SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF EITHER THE SECOND FREON LOOP
OR THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-210
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/08/87
ATCS
3052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A COMPLETE STRUCTURAL LOSS OF THE ACOD MEANS LOSS OF THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR AND A LEAK WITHIN THE FREON LOOP SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-211
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3053 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT
RESTRICTED FLOW (WATER)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT WILL
MEAN, WORST CASE, A COMPLETE LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR.
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-212
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o8/87
ATCS
3054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF STEAM FROM THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT
WILL RESULT IN MOISTURE BEING INTRODUCED INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE.
IF ALL COMPONENTS IN THE FUSELAGE ARE ADEQUATELY SEALED AND
PROTECTED, THIS WILL NOT CAUSE ANY ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS.
HOWEVER, IF THE MOISTURE CAN REACH AVIONICS BAY OR WIDE BUNDLES,
NUMEROUS ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS CAN OCCUR. WORST CASE WILL RESULT
IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR BEING DISABLED TO ELIMINATE THE SOURCE
OF THE STEAM AND A MINIMUM DURATION MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-213
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3055 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
H HEATERS
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR- EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, AND
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
EXIT DUCT
HEATERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 50V63HR30, 31, 32, 33
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A HEATER FAILED OFF WILL MEAN THE LOSS OF THAT HEATER SYSTEM OVER
THE ENTIRE TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT
HEATERS ON THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT WILL MEAN LOSS OF THE
DUCT, LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR, AND A MINIMUM DURATION
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-214
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3056 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
H THERMOSTATS
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, AND
FAILS CLOSED - REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CONTROLLERS FOR 50V63HR30, 31, 32, AND 33
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILED REFLECTING A LOW TEMPERATURE IS EQUIVALENT TO
A HEATER FAILED ON. THIS FAILURE WILLRESULT IN THE FAILURE OF
ALL HEATERS ON THE SAME SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-215
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3057 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
H THERMOSTATS
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, AND
FAILS OPEN - REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CONTROLLERS FOR 50V63HR30, 31, 32, AND 33
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILED REFLECTING A HIGH TEMPERATURE IS EQUIVALENT
TO A HEATER FAILED OFF. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT HEATERS ON THE
EXIT DUCT WILL MEAN LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-216
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 3058 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, AND
H TEMPERATURE MONITOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
1810A)
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63MT34, 35, 15A, 16A (V62TIS01A, 1802A, 1800A,
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A MONITOR GIVING AN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT WILL GIVE ERRONEOUS
INFORMATION ON SM DISPLAYS AND IN DOWNLINK DATA. THE CREW/GROUND
CAN ISOLATE THE PROBLEM TO A FAILED SENSOR THRU MALFUNCTION
PROCEDURES WITH NO FURTHER IMPACT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FP), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3059 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
312R
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT ZONE F AND H
OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THE OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT TO OPEN WILL RESULT IN A
TEMPERATURE IN EXCESS OF 285-295 DEGREE F. NOTE: IN ORDER FOR
THIS SITUATION TO OCCUR, A DOUBLE FAILURE MUST HAVE HAPPENED -
THE CONTROLLING THERMOSTAT MUST HAVE FAILED CLOSED, THE
OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT MUST HAVE FAILED TO OPEN, AND THE
MONITORING/ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM MUST BE OUTPUTTING ERRONEOUS
INFORMATION SO THAT THE OVERTEMP CONDITION WAS NOT RECOGNIZED.
THE END RESULT WILL STILL BE THE OPERATIONAL LOSS OF ALL HEATERS
ON THE FAILED SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-218
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6109/87
ATCS
3060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH SONIC NOZZLES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63TP227, 228
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT WOULD AFFECT ORBIT
ATTITUDE, DUE TO A NONBALANCED PROPULSIVE FORCE. THIS WILL MEAN
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102, SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2, JSC-19935
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-219
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3061 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH SONIC NOZZLE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63TP227, 228
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE SONIC NOZZLE WITHIN THE VEHICLE
ENVELOPE MEANS MOISTURE BEING INTRODUCED INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE
COMPARTMENT. IF THE AVIONICS AREAS AND WIRE BUNDLES ARE
ADEQUATELY SEALED, THEN THE MOISTURE SHOULD NOT CAUSE ANY
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, MOISTURE INTRODUCED INTO AN
UNSEALED ENVIRONMENT COULD CAUSE NUMEROUS ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS.
ONCE A LEAK IN THE NOZZLE HAS BEEN CONFIRMED, THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR SHOULD BE SHUT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-220
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3062 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
G AND I
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE HEATER ZONE
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63A17, 50V63A18
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A HEATER WHICH FAILS OFF WILL RESULT IN AN UNDERTEMP CONDITION.
THE SECONDARY HEATER IS STILL AVAILABLE FOR USE. HOWEVER, IF
BOTH HEATERS ARE LOST, THE NOZZLE IS ALSO CONSIDERED LOST AS IS
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR WILL
RESULT IN A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET I OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3063 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE ZONE G AND I
HEATER CONTROLLERS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, LOSS OF INPUT,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT FOR THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE
CONSISTS OF A TEMPERATURE SENSOR, A RESISTANCE BRIDGE, AND A
CONTROLLER. ANY ITEM IN THAT CIRCUIT ("THE BLACK BOX") WHICH
FAILS SO THAT IT APPEARS THE TEMPERATURE IS ALWAYS OVER THE UPPER
LIMIT WILL PRODUCE THE SAME RESPONSE AS HAVING THE HEATER FAILED
OFF. A HEATER FAILED OFF MEANS POSSIBLE ICING OF THE NOZZLE AND
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, LOSS OF THE NOZZLE AND LOSS OF THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS
A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-222
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3064 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE ZONE G AND I
HEATER CONTROLLERS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD : W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, LOSS OF INPUT,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT FOR THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE
CONSISTS OF A TEMPERATURE SENSOR, A RESISTANCE BRIDGE, AND A
CONTROLLER. ANY ITEM IN THE CIRCUIT WHICH FAILS SUCH THAT THE
TEMPERATURE IS ALWAYS SHOWN TO BE BELOW THE LOWER LIMIT WILL HAVE
THE SAME EFFECT AS FAILING A HEATER ON.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 3065 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE TEMPERATURE
MONITORS - ZONES G AND I
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
S)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
50V63MT27, 26A (V63TI879A, 1878A)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSORS GIVING ERRONEOUS DATA CAN BE DETERMINED BY CREW/GROUND
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES WITH NO IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FP), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-224
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 3066 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE A/B FROM WATER SUPPLY TO VALVE/WATER
NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES
FAILURE MODE: NO FLOW (RESTRICTED FLOW)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/1R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD/MID/AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BLOCKAGE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FES FEEDLINES A AND B TRANSPORT WATER FROM THE POTABLE WATER
SUPPLY TANKS TO THE FLASH EVAPORATORS. NO FLOW THRU FEEDLINE A
WILL MEAN FEEDLINE B MUST BE USED. IF FEEDLINE B THEN FAILS, THE
RESULT WILL BE THE LOSS OF BOTH FLASH EVAPORATORS AND BY
FLIGHT RULES, ENTRY AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE GO/NO GO POINT.
LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP
CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. SCREEN B IS NOT
APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE TWO FEEDLINES ARE "STANBY REDUNDANT" TO
EACH OTHER, THEREBY NOT REQUIRING SCREEN B TO BE APPLIED.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 3067 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE A/B FROM WATER SUPPLY TO WATER/VALVE
NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD/MID/AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK IN FEEDLINE B CAN BE CONTAINED BY CLOSING THE B SUPPLY
ISOLATION VALVE. THIS HAS NO IMPACT ON MISSION SUCCESS OR
FAILURE. HOWEVER, A LEAK IN FEEDLINE A REQUIRES THE SUPPLY WATER
CROSS-OVER VALVE PLUS SUPPLY WATER TANKS A AND B OUTLET VALVES BE
CLOSED. THIS ELIMINATES THE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY AND THE
ABILITY TO RECHARGE THE EMU. IT ALSO ALLOWS ONLY TWO WATER TANKS
TO BE USED DURING ENTRY. THE LEAK IN FEEDLINE A IS A DEFINITE
MISSION IMPACT. LEAKS IN BOTH FEEDLINES ELIMINATE ALL METHODS OF
GETTING RID OF EXCESS WATER EXCEPT FOR THE FUEL CELL WATER VENT.
LOSS OF THIS FINAL, UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WOULD MEAN FLOODING OF THE
FUEL CELLS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 6.4 SHEET 1 OF I,
SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-226
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3068 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE HEATERS
LOSS OF OUTPUT, NO HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/MID/AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: 40V63HR7-14; 50V63HR15, 16, 35
40V63HR17-24; 50V63HR25, 26, 41
FDLN B:
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITHIN EACH FEEDLINE, THERE ARE TWO REDUNDANT HEATERS. LOSS OF
BOTH HEATERS CAN RESULT IN A LINE FREEZE-UP AND NO FLOW THRU THE
FEEDLINE. NO FLOW THRU THE FEEDLINE WILL RESULT IN ENTRY AT NEXT
PRIMARY LANDING SITE IF BOTH FEEDLINES ARE LOST. LOSS OF
BOTH FEEDLINES MEANS LOSS OF FES WHICH WHEN COMBINED WITH LOSS OF
ONE FREON LOOP MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-227
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3069 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE FORWARD HEATER THERMOSTATS
FAILS REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF : 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/MID/AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: 40V63S5-I0; 50V63S2, 5, 45, 47
40V63SII-16; 50V63S3, 4, 49, 51
FDLN B :
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE THERMOSTAT FAILING IN A LOW TEMPERATURE MODE WILL FAIL THE
HEATER ON. THIS WILL EVENTUALLY RESULT IN AN OVERTEMPERATURE
SITUATION AND AN SM ALERT. THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT TN THE LOSS
OF ALL HEATERS ON THE SAME SYSTEM AS THE FAILED THERMOSTAT.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-228
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/12/87
ATCS
3070
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE FORWARD HEATER THERMOSTATS
FAILS REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/AFT/MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: 40V63S5-I0; 50V63S2, 5, 45, 47
40V63SII-16; 50V63S3, 4, 49, 51
FDLN B:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATER WILL REMAIN OFF IF THERMOSTAT FAILED IN A MODE REFLECTING
HIGH TEMPERATURE. LOSS OF ONE THERMOSTAT WILL RESULT IN THE
EFFECTIVE LOSS OF ALL HEATERS ON THE SAME SYSTEM. LOSS OF BOTH
HEATER SYSTEMS ON THE SAME FEEDLINE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
THAT FEEDLINE AND LOSS OF BOTH FEEDLINES WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS
OF THE FES. LOSS OF FES COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP
CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/12/87
ATCS
3071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
3) FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/AFT/MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MSIDs: V63TI870A-77A, 92A, 94A FDLN A:
40V63MT18, 20, 22, 24; 50V63MT41 FDLN B: 40V63MT19, 21, 23, 25;
50V63MT43
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR WITH AN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT WILL REFLECT
INCORRECT DATA ON SM DISPLAYS AND IN SM ALERT STATUSES.
CREW/GROUND CAN ISOLATE FAILURE TO A FAILED SENSOR THRU
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES. LOSS WILL NOT AFFECT FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-230
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/13/87
ATCS
3072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES ACCUMULATOR HEATER
LOSS OF OUTPUT, NO HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE - FES FEEDLINE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63HR90 CONNECTORS 1 & 2; HTR 2-
50V63HR90 CONNECTORS 3 & 4. FDLN B: HTR 1-50V63HR91 CONNECTORS
1 & 2; HTR 2-50V63HR91 CONNECTORS 3 & 4
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A HEATER IN THE ACCUMULATOR AREA COULD AFFECT ACCUMULATOR
OPERATION. LOSS OF BOTH ACCUMULATORS WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
BOTH FLASH EVAPORATORS AND ENTRY AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE BY
FLIGHT RULES. LOSS OF BOTH FLASH EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH
LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP MAY MEAN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/13/87
ATCS
3073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES ACCUMULATOR HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILS REFLECTING HIGH TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE - FES FEEDLINE
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63S40; HTR 2-50V63S48.
HTR 1-50V63S45; HTR 2-50V63S43
FDLN B:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILED REFLECTING A HIGH TEMPERATURE MEANS THE
HEATER WILL NEVER TURN ON. THIS IS AN EQUIVALENT FAILURE TO
HEATER FAILED OFF. LOSS OF A HEATER IN THE ACCUMULATOR AREA
COULD AFFECT ACCUMULATOR OPERATION. LOSS OF BOTH ACCUMULATORS
WILL MEAN LOSS OF BOTH FLASH EVAPORATORS AND ENTRY AT NEXT
PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING COMBINED WITH LOSS
OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-232
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3074 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES ACCUMULATOR HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILS REFLECTING LOW TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE - FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR
PART NUMBER: FDLN A: HTR 1-50V63S40; HTR 2-50V63S48.
HTR 1-50V3S45; HTR 2-50V63S43.
FDLN B:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE THERMOSTAT FAILING IN A LOW TEMPERATURE MODE WILL FAIL THE
HEATER ON. THIS WILL EVENTUALLY RESULT IN AN OVERTEMPERATURE
SITUATION,AN SM ALERT, AND EFFECTIVE LOSS OF ALL HEATERS ON THE
SAME SYSTEM AS THE FAILED THERMOSTAT.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-233
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o5/87
ATCS
3075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES ACCUMULATOR TEMPERATURE MONITOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V63TI750A, 50V63MT38 - PRIMARY; V63TI760A,
50V63MT39 - SECONDARY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR REFLECTING ERRONEOUS OUTPUT WILL REFLECT
INCORRECT DATA ON SM DISPLAYS AND IN SM ALERT STATUSES.
CREW/GROUND CAN ISOLATE FAILURE TO A FAILED SENSOR THRU
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES. LOSS WILL NOT AFFECT FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FP), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-234
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3076 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR STATUS MONITOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM
FEEDLINE/SUPPLY SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
PRIMARY-SI-V63XI751E; SECONDARY-V63XI761E
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR REFLECTS ONLY IF PRESSURE IS "'OK" OR "NOT OK". ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT WILL BE REFLECTED ON SM DISPLAYS AND IN SM ALERTS.
PROBLEM CAN BE ISOLATED TO SENSOR FAILURE THRU GROUND/CREW
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES. FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT FUTURE
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ) SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
ATCS
3077
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR
LOSES N2 CHARGE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR
FEEDLINE SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 CHARGE IN ACCUMULATOR CAN CAUSE WATER HAMMER EFFECT IN
THE FEEDLINE AND ERRATIC FES OPERATIONS. WORST CASE RESULT OF
ERRATIC FES OPERATION WILL BE EFFECTIVE LOSS OF BOTH FLASH
EVAPORATORS. LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF
ONE FREON LOOP CAN MEAN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2, JSC
FLIGHT RULES
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-236
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3078 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR
FEEDLINE SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK IN THE FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR WILL HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS A
LEAK IN THE FEEDLINE ITSELF AND WILL CAUSE THE FEEDLINE TO BE
LOST. LOSS OF BOTH FEEDLINES WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF BOTH FLASH
EVAPORATORS AND ENTRY AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF
ALL FES COOLING COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN MEAN
THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-237
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3079 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH
FAILS IN "ON"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
PRIMARY A - $31; PRIMARY B - $32; SECONDARY - $33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ANY FES CONTROLLER SWITCH IN THE "ON" POSITION DURING
LAUNCH OR DEORBIT ALLOWS THE POSSIBILITY TO EXIST FOR OPERATION
AT LOWER THAN DESIRED ALTITUDES. THIS MEANS DAMAGE TO THE
EVAPORATOR CORE AND LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR DURING FUTURE
OPERATIONS. THE FAILURE ALSO CONSTRAINS THE SYSTEM TO OPERATION
ON THE "FAILED SYSTEM" (ONLY ONE SYSTEM CAN BE ACTIVATED AT A
TIME. )
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
ATCS
3080
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH
FAILS IN "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
3) CONTROLLER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
PRIMARY A - $31; PRIMARY B - $32; SECONDARY - $33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ANY FES CONTROLLER SWITCH IN THE "OFF" POSITION
ELIMINATES THAT SYSTEM FROM FUTURE OPERATIONS. ALL THREE
CONTROLLER SWITCHES FAILED TO "OFF" MEANS LOSS OF ALL FLASH
EVAPORATORS. LOSS OF ALL FLASH EVAPORATORS FOLLOWED BY A LOSS OF
ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
ATCS
3081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH
FAILS IN "GPC"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL LIA2
PART NUMBER: PRIMARY A - $31; PRIMARY B - $32; SECONDARY - $33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING LAUNCH AND DEORBIT, FAILURE OF THE FIRST CONTROLLER SWITCH
IN GPC HAS NO AFFECTION OPERATIONS. IF MORE THAN ONE SWITCH IS
FAILED IN GPC, THEN THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR MORE THAN ONE
CONTROLLER TO RECEIVE THE "ON" COMMAND FROM THE BFS. THIS CAN
ACTIVATE MULTIPLE NOZZLES AND INTRODUCE TOO MUCH SPRAY INTO THE
FES WITH POSSIBLE FREEZING/CORE DAMAGE. DURING ON-ORBIT, THE
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF THAT FES SYSTEM. (GPC COMMANDS ARE
SENT BY THE BFS). FREEZING OF BOTH FESs FOLLOWED BY AN
INABILITY TO THAW THEM OUT COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP
CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-240
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3082 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER SWITCH STATUS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD : W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: PRIMARY A: ON-V63SI610E, GPC-V63SI600E; PRIMARY B:
ON-V63SI660E, GPC-V63SI650E; SECONDARY: ON-V63SI710E, GPC-
V63SI700E
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS INFORMATION ON THE SWITCH STATUS MEANS ERRONEOUS DATA
BEING DISPLAYED IN THE DOWNLINK. NO AFFECTS ON ACTUAL
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3083 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER INPUT DIODES
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
CONTROL POWER DIODES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: PRIMARY A: A3CRI, A3CRI0; PRIMARY B:
A3CR9; SECONDARY: A3CR3, A3CR8
A3CR2,
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE DIODE IN AN OPEN CIRCUIT CONDITION MEANS THE
CORRECT SIGNAL WILL NOT GET TO THE FES ELECTRONICS. LOSS OF ANY
ONE DIODE MEANS THE LOSS OF ONE SWITCH COMMAND OPTION (ON/GPC) ON
ONE FES SYSTEM (PRIMARY A, PRIMARY B, SECONDARY). LOSS OF ALL
DIODES MEANS THE LOSS OF ALL FES. LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP
FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF ALL FES CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-242
POWER
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
ATCS
3084
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER INPUT RESISTORS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
CONTROL RESISTORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SECONDARY:
FLIGHT DECK
PRIMARY A:
A3R7, A2R6
A2R2, A3RI; PRIMARY B: A3R5, A2R4;
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE RESISTORS SERVE AS LOAD LEVELERS OF THE MDM INPUT. FAILING
THEM OPEN MEANS ERRONEOUS DATA WILL BE SENT TO THE MDM AND
DISPLAYED ON CREW/GROUND DISPLAY. NO EFFECT ON FUTURE FES
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-243 L,.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3085 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROL SWITCH INPUT RESISTORS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
STATUS SIGNAL RESISTORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL LIA2
PART NUMBER: PRIMARY A: ON-A3R24, GPC-A2R8; PRIMARY B:
A3R25, GPC-A3R9; SECONDARY: ON-A3R26; GPC-A2RII
ON-
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE INPUT RESISTOR FAILING OPEN WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER
TO ONE COMMAND SWITCH POSITION ON ONE FES SYSTEM. LOSS OF ALL
RESISTORS MEANS THE LOSS OF ALL FES. LOSS OF ALL FES FOLLOWED BY
THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-244
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3086 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROL SWITCH INPUT RESISTORS
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
3) CONTROLLER
CONTROL BUS POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK -PANEL LIA2
PART NUMBER: PRIMARY A: ON-A3R24; GPC-A2RS; PRIMARY B:
A3R25, GPC-A3R9; SECONDARY: ON-A3R26, GPC-A2RII
ON-
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INPUT RESISTOR FAILING IN A "SHORTED" CONDITION MEANS THAT
INCORRECT VOLTAGES MAY BE APPLIED ACROSS DOWNSTREAM COMPONENTS.
THIS SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3087 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER POWER APPLICATION COMPONENTS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
POWER APPLICATION CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 10AMP FUSES, PNP TRANSISTORS, NAND GATES - 2 PER
CONTROLLER, 5.1K RESISTOR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE "BLACK BOX" DELIVERS POWER TO THE REMAINDER OF THE FES
CONTROL CIRCUIT. FAILURE OF THE BLACK BOX MEANS FAILURE OF THE
ASSOCIATED FES. LOSS OF ALL BLACK BOXES MEANS LOSS OF ALL FES.
LOSS OF ALL FES COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-246
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
ATCS
3088
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH
ONE OR MORE CONTACTS STUCK IN "OFF" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
ENABLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
$34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH FES CONTROLLER RECEIVES THE "HIGH LOAD OFF" SIGNAL FROM A
DIFFERENT SET OF CONTACTS ON THE HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH. ANY OR
ALL CONTACTS STUCK IN OFF MEANS THE HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR CANNOT BE
OPERATED ON THAT CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL CONTACTS OR A
MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE SWITCH MEANS A TOTAL LOSS OF THE HI-
LOAD EVAP. (NOTE: THE CONTRLR DOES NOT RECEIVE A HI-LOAD ENABLE
SIGNAL; IT SIMPLY RECEIVES AN INPUT THAT THE HI-LOAD EVAP IS NO
LONGER "OFF".) SCREEN C FAILS BECAUSE A MECHANICAL
JAM OF THE SWITCH WILL ELIMINATE THE HI-LOAD FROM ALL
CONTROLLERS. FAILURE IS ASSIGNED A 2/IR CRITICALITY BEAUSE,
WORST CASE, THE HI-LOAD EVAP IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE, & THE NEXT
FAILURE (LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP) COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-247
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3089 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH
ONE OR MORE CONTACTS NOT MAKING IN "OFF" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
ENABLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: PANEL LIA2
PART NUMBER: $34: PRIMARY A - CONTACT 4; PRIMARY B - CONTACT 7;
PRIMARY C - CONTACT 12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CIRCUITRY ASSOCIATED WITH THE HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH DOES NOT
REFLECT THE SYSTEM IS ENABLED, IT TELLS THE ASSOCIATED CONTROLLER
THAT THE HI-LOAD EVAP IS NO LONGER "OFF". THEREFORE, LOSS OF ONE
"OFF" CONTACT MEANS THE HI-LOAD EVAP WILL BE ENABLED
WHENEVER THE CNTRLR ASSOCIATED WITH THAT CONTACT IS SELECTED.
LOSS OF ALL "OFF" CONTACTS OR A MECHANICAL JAM OF THE SWITCH
MEANS THE HI-LOAD EVAP WILL ALWAYS BE ENABLED. SCREEN C FAILS
SINCE ONLY ONE SWITCH IS I_OLVED, ONE MECHANICAL JAM ELIMINATES
ALL CONTROL PATHS. CONSTANT ENABLE OF THE HI-LOD WILL PRESENST A
PROBLEM DURING ON-ORBIT PHASES WHEN WATER MGMT PROBLEMS MUST BE
ADDRESSED OR WHEN THE SPRAY INTERFERES WITH PAYLOAD EXPERIMENTS.
DURING ASCENT AND ENTRY, THE HI-LOAD IS ENABLED ANYWAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-248
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3090 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH STATUS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD : W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
ENABLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: V63KI620E
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT REFLECTS THE HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR SWITCH IS OR IS
NOT IN THE ENABLE POSITION. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF THIS DATA WILL
MEAN INCORRECT DATA IN DISPLAY BUT WILL NOT AFFECT FUTURE
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-249
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
ATCS
3091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: POWER SUPPLIES FOR 50V63AI4, 50V63AI5, 50V63AI6.
(COMPONENTS INCLUDE: TRANSFORMER, ZENER DIODE, VOLTAGE
REGULATOR).
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS FUNCTION TOGETHER TO SUPPLY 9 VOLTS
DC TO THE LOGIC CIRCUITS AND 28V DC TO THE VALVE DRIVER CIRCUIT.
A FAILURE OF ANY FES CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY MEANS A LOSS OF THAT
CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL POWER SUPPLIES MEAN A LOSS OF
ALL FES. LOSS OF EITHER THE 9V DC LOGIC POWER OR THE 28V DC
VALVE DRIVER IS EQUIVALENT TO A TOTAL LOSS OF THE POWER SUPPLY.
FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF ALL FES, A SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF ONE FREON
LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FG)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-250
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
3092 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-LESS THAN 41 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
3) CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: CONTROLLER A: 807-1; CONTROLLER B: 807-2
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CONSTANT OUTPUT OF LESS THAN 41 DEGREES F WILL PREVENT THE
FLASH EVAPORATOR TURNING ON. THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO A LOSS OF THE
CONTROLLER FOR A FAILURE OF ONLY ONE TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND A
LOSS OF ONE FLASH EVAPORATOR IF BOTH PRIMARY TEMPERATURE
SENSORS ARE LOST (THE SECONDARY CONTROLLER WHICH IS STILL
AVAILABLE CAN ONLY OPERATE ONE FES AT A TIME.) HOWEVER, LOSS OF
ALL THREE CONTROLLERS WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ALL FES, WHICH,
WHEN COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-251
INDEPNDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 3093 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-GREATER THAN 41 DEGREES F BUT
LESS THAN 63 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: CONTROLLER A: 807-1; CONTROLLER B: 807-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SENSOR REFLECTING A TEMPERATURE IN THE RANGE OF 41-63 DEGREES F
MEANS THE TOPPING ISOLATION VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN. THE ACTUAL
WATER PULSING INTO THE EVAPORATOR IS CONTROLLED BY THE OUTLET
TEMPERATURE SENSOR SO CORE DAMAGE/ICING SHOULD NOT BE A
RESULT. ADDITIONALLY, IN THIS RANGE, IF THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
IS ALREADY ENABLED WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURS, IT WILL CONTINUE TO
OPERATE AND NEVER BE DISABLED. IF THE HI-LOAD IS NOT ENABLED, IT
WILL NEVER BE OPERABLE ON THE FAILED CONTROLLER. LOSS OF
ALL CONTROLLERS WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING WHICH
WHEN COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-252
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
3094 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-GREATER THAN 63 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: CONTROLLER A: 807-1; CONTROLLER B: 807-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TEMPERATURE OUTPUT IN EXCESS OF 63 DEGREES F MEANS THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND THE HI-
LOAD EVAPORATOR ENABLED, IF THE HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH IS IN THE
APPROPRIATE POSITION. ACTUAL OPERATION OF THE EVAPORATORS IS
CONTROLLED BY ANOTHER TEMPERATURE SENSOR, SO THERE SHOULD BE NO
CORE DAMAGE/ICING AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
ATCS
3095
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE:
FES SECONDARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-LESS THAN 62 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
807-3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SECONDARY CONTROLLER TEMPERATURE LESS THAN 62 DEGREES F MEANS
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR WILL NOT TURN ON. IF THE HIGH LOAD
EVAPORATOR HAS BEEN SELECTED FOR USE, ITS OPERATION IS CONTROLLED
BY THE OUTPUT FROM A DIFFERENT TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND WILL NOT
BE AFFECTED BY 807-3. THE PRIMARY CONTROLLERS ARE STILL
AVAILABLE, AND LOSS OF TOPPING EVAPORATOR IS DEFINED ONLY AS A
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-254
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
ATCS
3096
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE:
FES SECONDARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-GREATER THAN 62 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
807-3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SECONDARY MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE SENSOR IN SUCH A
WAY THAT THE TEMPERATURE ALWAYS APPEARS GREATER THAN 62 DEGREES F
MEANS THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR WILL ALWAYS BE OPERATING. DEPENDING
ON THE TEMPERATURE REFLECTED AND THE HEAT LOADS INVOLVED
THIS CAN LEAD TO ICING AND EVAPORATOR CORE DAMAGE - EFFECTIVELY A
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-255
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
3097 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE :
FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-LESS THAN 39 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CONTROLLER A: 807-4; CONTROLLER B: 807-5
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF ALL OTHER TEMPERATURE SENSORS ARE OPERATING CORRECTLY, THE
FAILURE OF THIS SENSOR, MEANS THERE WILL BE NO PULSES GENERATED
TO ACTIVATE THE EVAPORATOR PULSAR VALVES - NO OPERATION OF THE
EVAPORATOR REGARDLESS OF THE INPUT TEMPERATURES. THE FAILURE OF
ONE SENSOR IN THIS CONDITION MEANS THE LOSS OF ONE CONTROLLER,
FAILURE OF BOTH MEANS THE LOSS OF BOTH CONTROLLERS WITH ONLY THE
SECONDARY CONTROLLER REMAINING. LOSS OF ALL CONTROLLERS MEANS
THE LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING WHICH COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF
ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-256
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
3098 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE:
FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-GREATER THAN 39 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: CONTROLLER A: 807-4; CONTROLLER: 807-5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PULSER VALVES ARE OPERATED AT A FREQUENCY PROPORTIONAL TO THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OUTPUT TEMPERATURE AND 39 DEGREES F, PLUS
A CORRECTIONFACTOR FOR THE RATE OF CHANGE OF THE INPUT
TEMPERATURE. THEREFORE AN INCORRECT TEMPERATURE WILL MEAN AN
INCORRECT PULSING FREQUENCY. HOWEVER, ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IS
PROVIDED BY THE MIDPOINT AND SHUTDOWN TEMPERATURE SENSORS. IF
THESE SENSORS ARE OPERATING CORRECTLY, THERE SHOULD BE NO DAMAGE
TO THE EVAPORATOR ALTHOUGH THE CONTROLLER MUST BE CONSIDERED
LOST. LOSS OF ALL CONTROLLERS MEANS A LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING
WHICH COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-257
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3099 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/!R
ITEM: FES SECONDARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-LESS THAN 62 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
807-6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SELECTED EVAPORATOR WILL NOT BE OPERABLE ON THE SECONDARY
CONTROLLER. THE ACTIVATION TEMPERATURE WILL NEVER BE REACHED.
THIS IS EFFECTIVELY THE SAME AS THE LOSS OF THE SECONDARY
CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL CONTROLLERS MEANS A LOSS OF ALL FES
COOLING. LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE
FREON LOOP COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-258
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: FES SECONDARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-GREATER THAN 62 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
807-6
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SELECTED EVAPORATOR WILL OPERATE AT AN INCORRECT PULSE
FREQUENCY BASED ON THE INCORRECT INPUT TEMPERATURE. THIS MAY
LEAD TO ICING AND CORE DAMAGE SINCE THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL
SHUTDOWN LOGIC FOR THE SECONDARY CONTROLLER. WORST CASE WOULD BE
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR WHICH COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF
ONE FREON LOOP CAN MEAN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 3101 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC TEMPERATURE
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-GREATER THAN 41.5 DEGREES F OR
LESS THAN 37 DEGREES F
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SECONDARY:
AFT FUSELAGE
CONTROLLER A:
807-9
807-7; CONTROLLER B: 807-8;
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SHUTDOWN SENSOR STUCK IN ONE OF THE ABOVE TEMPERATURE RANGES
WILL RESULT IN A PREMATURE SHUTDOWN OF THE FES BY THE ASSOCIATED
CONTROLLER. THE FES WILL STILL BE OPERATIONAL ON THE REMAINING
CONTROLLER(S), (NOTE, THE SECONDARY SENSOR PROVIDES BACKUP
SHUTDOWN LOGIC FOR CONTROLLER A.) HOWEVER, THIS SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED AS A LOSS OF THE CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL CONTROLLERS
MEANS LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING WHICH IF COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF
ONE FREON LOOP COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-260
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3102 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE:
DEGREES F
FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-BETWEEN 37.5 DEGREES F AND 41
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
TEMPERATURE INPUTS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/2R ATO: 3/2R
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: CONTROLLER A: 807-7; CONTROLLER B: 807-8;
SECONDARY: 807-9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STICKING THE SHUTDOWN TEMPERATURE SENSOR IN THE NOMINAL
TEMPERATURE RANGE ELIMINATES ONE LEVEL OF PROTECTIVE REDUNDANCY.
ASSUMING NO OTHER FAILURES, THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IF ANY OF THE REMAINING TEMPERATURE CONTROL MECHANISMS
FAILS, THEN ICING AND/OR CORE DAMAGE COULD RESULT WITH THE
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR. NOTE: THE "SECONDARY"
CONTROLLER PROVIDES BACKUP SHUTDOWN LOGIC FOR CONTROLLER A.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6123187
ATCS
3103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
SHUTDOWN LOGIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE (741-1, 741-2)
PART NUMBER: VARIOUS COMPONENTS INCLUDING: I-AND GATE; 2-OR
GATES; 9 NAND GATES, 8 NOR GATES, 1 AMP.; 6 INVERTING AMPS; 4
FLIP FLOPS; 2 CLOCK/TIME DELAY; 3 COMPARATORS; 1 RATE SAMPLER; 1
RELAY; 1 DIODE
CAUSES: OVERVOLTAGE, THERMAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF THE PRIMARY CONTROLLERS SHUTDOWN LOGIC
RESULTS IN THE SHUTDOWN OF THE FES BY THE ACTIVE CONTROLLER. THE
SCONDARY SHUTDOWN LOGIC PROVIDES BACKUP SHUTDOWN LOGIC TO THE A
CONTROLLER.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-262
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROLLER
SHUTDOWN LOGIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: VARIOUS COMPONENTS INCLUDING: 1-AND GATE; 2-OR
GATES; 9 NAND GATES; 8 NOR GATES; 1 AMP.; 6 INVERTING AMPLIFIERS;
4 FLIP FLOPS; 2 CLOCK/TIME DELAY; 3 COMPARATORS; 1 RATE SAMPLER;
1 RELAY; 1 DIODE
CAUSES: OVERVOLTAGE, THERMAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THE SHUTDOWN LOGIC TO OPERATE WHEN REQUIRED MEANS
THAT ICING OF THE EVAPORATOR CAN OCCUR. SINCE THIS ICING OCCURS
ONLY ON-ORBIT, THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR
ONLY AND WILL NOT AFFECT THE HIGH LOAD. NOTE: THE
SHUTDOWN LOGIC IS REQUIRED ONLY WHEN AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE HAS
OCCURED.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
3105 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
AND SECONDARY)
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD VALVE PULSER ELECTRONICS (PRIMARY A, B,
GENERATES INCORRECT REQUENCY (SLOW)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROL LOGIC
HI-LOAD VALVE CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: VARIOUS LOGIC GATES, INVERTORS, INTEGRATORS,
SUMMERS, AND VOLTAGE SHAPERS
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, LOSS OF
INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FREQUENCY WHICH IS TOO SLOW WILL RESULT IN INSUFFIENT COOLING.
IF ALL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUITS FAIL IN THE SAME WAY, CREW ACTIONS
MAY BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE ORBITER POWER LEVELS. WORST CASE, THIS
CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR CAUSING A
LANDING AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD
EVAPORATOR FOLLOWED BY LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-264
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
3106 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
AND SECONDARY)
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD VALVE PULSER ELECTRONICS (PRIMARY A, B,
GENERATES INCORRECT FREQUENCY-(FAST)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
CONTROL LOGIC
HI-LOAD VALVE CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: VARIOUS LOGIC GATES, INVERTERS, INTEGRATORS,
SUMMERS, AND VOLTAGE SHAPERS
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FREQUENCY WHICH IS TOO FAST WILL RESULT IN TOO MUCH WATER BEING
INTRODUCED INTO THE EVAPORATOR. THE WATER WILL NOT BE COMPLETELY
VAPORIZED. THIS CAN LEAD TO ICING AND LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR IF
NOT DETECTED. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR FOLLOWED
BY A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. LOSS
OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR, ALONE, MEANS AUTOMATIC LOSS OF
MISSION AND LANDING AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-265
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
3107 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
SECONDARY)
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD ISOLATION VALVE RELAY (PRIMARY A, B, AND
INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD VALVE CONTROL
ISOLATION VALVE RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERVOLTAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE RELAY FAILING WITH INTERMITTENT OPERATION MEANS THE
ISOLATION VALVE AND SPRAY VALVE WILL NOT BE OPERATING IN TANDEM
AS DESIGNED. THIS, IN TURN, MEANS THE COOLING REQUIREMENTS WILL
NOT BE MET USING THE FAILED CONTROLLER/RELAY. LOSS OF ALL
CONTROLLER/RELAY COMBINATIONS MEANS LOSS OF THE HI-LOAD
EVAPORATORS AND LANDING AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. LOSS OF
THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP MAY
MEAN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-266
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24187
ATCS
3108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
SECONDARY)
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD SPRAY VALVE RELAY (PRIMARY A, B, AND
INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD VALVE CONTROL
ISOLATION VALVE RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERVOLTAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE RELAY FAILING WITH INTERMITTENT OPERATION MEANS THE
SPRAY VALVE AND ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT BE OPERATING IN TANDEM
AS DESIGNED. THIS, IN TURN, MEANS THE COOLING REQUIREMENTS WILL
NOT BE MET USING THE FAILED CONTROLLER/RELAY AND EFFECTIVE
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD MEANS
AUTOMATIC LOSS OF MISSION AND LANDING AT NEXT PLS. LOSS OF HIGH
LOAD COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FK)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
3109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE/HOLDING COIL
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR VALVE CONTROL
ISOLATION VALVE RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE/HOLDING COILS RELAY SERVE
TO OPEN AND HOLD OPEN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE.
FAILURE OF OPERATION MEANS THE ISOLATION VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE CONTROLLER OF THE FES.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-268
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
3110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR SPRAY VALVE RELAY
INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR VALVE CONTROL
SPRAY VALVE RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANC SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THE SPRAY VALVE RELAY AT AN OFF-NOMINAL FREQUENCY
MEANS THE COOLING REQUIREMENTS OF THE SYSTEM WILL NOT BE MET.
LOSS OF ALL RELAYS IN THE SAME MANNER MEANS CREW ACTIONS MAY BE
REQUIRED TO REDUCE ORBITER POWER LEVELS.
REFERENCES:
2
VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF
REPORT DATE 11/24/-87 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
3111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GROUND OPERATIONS DIAGNOSTIC MEASUREMENTS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
/NA AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: (V63) K8111A; T8121A; K8101A; K8110A; F8006A;
F8010A; C8056A; F8061A; K8020E; K8050E; KS000E; T8122A; K8150E;
TSI20A; K8100A; F8005A; FS010A; C8056A; F8061A; C8055A; F8060A
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE SENSORS ARE USED ONLY DURING GROUND OPS FOR DIAGNOSTIC
PURPOSES. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM ANY OF THEM WILL AFFECT GROUND
TURN AROUND TIME BUT WILL NOT IMPACT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ, 60FK)
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-270
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
3112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES SECONDARY SUPPLY SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO EITHER A OR B POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
SECONDARY CONTROLLER
SUPPLY SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
$45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTS SECONDARY CONTROLLER TO EITHER A OR B WATER SUPPLY WHEN
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR IS ENABLED. NO EFFECT ON TOPPING EVAPORATOR
OPERATIONS. (PROBLEMS WILL ARISE IF SELECTED SYSTEM FAILS AND
BOTH PRIMARY CONTROLLERS ALSO FAIL.)
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-271
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES SECONDARY SUPPLY SELECT SWITCH
ONE "A" CONTACT FAILS TO MAKE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
SECONDARY CONTROLLER
SUPPLY SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
$45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SECONDARY SUPPLY SWITCH IS DESIGNED SO THAT THE CIRCUIT IS
COMPLETED WHEN THE "A" POSITION IS SELECTED AND OPENED WHEN THE
"B" POSITION IS COMPLETED. FAILING OF ONE "A" CONTACT THEN MEANS
THAT THE B SUPPLY IS ALWAYS SELECTED. NOTE: THIS ONLY
AFFECTS THE HIGH LOAD OPERATION ON THE SECONDARY CONTROLLER. THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR USES BOTH FEEDWATER SYSTEMS SIMULTANEOUSLY.
(PROBLEMS WILL ARISE IF THE B SUPPLY DEVELOPS A LEAK OR A
BLOCKAGE AND IF BOTH PRIMARY CONTROLLERS FAIL TO OPERATE.)
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FK), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 2 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-272
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
JAMMED IN "OFF" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
FEEDLINE SYSTEM
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
A SUPPLY - $23; B SUPPLY - $24
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANLDING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING EITHER FEEDLINE HEATER SELECT SWITCH IN THE "OFF"
POSITION MEANS THAT THE AFFECTED SYSTEM WILL HAVE NO HEAT APPLIED
TO IT AND WILL FREEZE-UP. THIS ELIMINATES ONE FEEDWATER PATH TO
THE EVAPORATORS. LOSS OF BOTH FEEDLINES MEANS THE LOSS OF THE
FES AND ENTRY TO NEXT PLS. LOSS OF THE FES COMBINED WITH THE
LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP MAY MEAN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-273
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO POSITION "I" OR TO POSITION "2"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
FEEDLINE SYSTEM
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
A SUPPLY - $23; B SUPPLY - $24
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE FEEDLINE HEATER SELECT SWITCH TO ONE OF THE TWO
OPERATING POSITIONS SIMPLY MEANS THE OTHER HEATING SYSTEM CANNOT
BE USED. ASSUMING NO ADDITIONAL FAILURES, THIS FAILURE SHOULD
HAVE NO IMPACT ON OPERATIONS. (ONE SET OF HEATERS ON EACH
FEEDLINE IS ALWAYS ENABLED.)
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-274
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE HEATER SWITCH STATUS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
s)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
FEEDLINE SYSTEM
HEATER SELECT SWITCH-STATUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
V631866E
PANEL LIA2
A SUPPLY: V631860E, V631861E; B SUPPLY: V631865E,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SENSOR REFLECTING INCORRECT DATA CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH BY
CREW AND/OR GROUND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES WITH NO IMPACT ON
FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-275
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FES FEEDLINE HEATER FUSES
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
FEEDLINE HEATER SYSTEM
INPUT FUSES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HEATERS
AFT FUSELAGE
5 AND i0 AMP FUSES BETWEEN THE INPUT POWER AND THE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FUSE BLOWING MEANS THE REQUIRED POWER WILL NOT REACH THE
HEATERS AND THE HEATERS WILL NOT OPERATE. LOSS OF ONE FUSE
RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ONE HEATER SYSTEM. LOSS OF ALL FUSES
RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ALL FEEDLINE HEATERS. LOSS OF ALL
FEEDLINE HEATERS WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF BOTH FEEDLINES, TOTAL
LOSS OF THE FES, AND LANDING AT NEXT PLS. TOTAL LOSS OF THE FES
COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-276
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/8v
ATCS
3118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH
FAILS IN "OFF" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD : W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
2)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
$39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE HEATER SELECT SWITCH IN THE "OFF" POSITION MEANS
THAT THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATERS WILL NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE -
AND THAT THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS A MINIMUM _WA_ION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-277
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/2s/s7
ATCS
3119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH
FAILS IN "A", "B", "A/B", OR "C" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
$39
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE HEATER SELECT SWITCH MEANS THAT ONLY
ONE HEATER SYSTEM WILL BE AVAILABLE. ASSUMING NO OTHER FAILURES.
THERE SHOULD BE NO IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS. A FAILURE DUE TO
CONTAMINATION ALLOWS THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE HEATER
SYSTEMS BEING ENABLED SIMULTANEOUSLY. AGAIN, NO IMPACT ON FUTURE
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-278
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH STATUS
ERONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
V63S2601E(A)
V63S2631E(C) ; V63S2621E(B) ; V63S2611E(A/B) ;
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL,
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SENSOR PROVIDING ERRONEOUS DATA CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH WITH
NO IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6125187
ATCS
3121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH FUSES
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL LIA2
PART NUMBER: 1 AMP FUSES BETWEEN CONTROL BUS AND HEATER SELECT
SWITCH (FI0-FI8)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOWING OF THE FUSE MEANS THE CONTROL BUS POWER WILL NOT REACH
THE SWITCH AND THE HEATERS WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ONE
FUSE MEANS LOSS OF ONE HEATER SYSTEM; LOSS OF ALL FUSES MEANS
LOSS OF ALL HEATERS AND LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR.
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR REQUIRES A MINIMUM DURATION
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-280
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER FUSES/RPCS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT INPUT FUSES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: i0 AMP FUSES PLUS 15 AND 20 AMP RPCS BETWEEN INPUT
POWER AND HEATERS
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPENING OF THE FUSES OR RPCS BETWEEN THE INPUT POWER AND THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT HEATERS REMOVES ONE HEATER SYSTEM
FROM FURTHER USE. LOSS OF ALL FUSES MEAN LOSS OF ALL HEATERS AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR REQUIRES A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-281
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER RELAY
DELAYED OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
DUCT HEATERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
RELAY USED TO COMPLETE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUITS
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A RELAY TO OPERATE PROPERLY RESULTS IN AN INCOMPLETE
HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT AND NO POWER TO THE AFFECTED HEATERS.
LOSS OF ONE RELAY ACTION MEANS LOSS OF ONE HEAT SYSTEM; LOSS OF
ALL RELAYS MEAN LOSS OF ALL HEATERS AND LOSS OF THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR REQUIRES A MINIMUM
DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-282
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
FAILS IN "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
LEFT- $37; RIGHT - $38
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SWITCH IN THE "OFF" POSITION FAILS ALL HEATERS ON
THE AFFECTED NOZZLE. REMOVAL OF HEAT WILL RESULT IN ICING AND
LOSS OF THE ONE NOZZLE. LOSS OF THE NOZZLE WILL MEAN EFFECTIVE
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
3125 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
STATUS
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: LEFT: HTR A-V63SI880E; HTR B-V63SI881E.
HTR A-V631885E; HTR B-V631886E
RIGHT:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SENSOR FAILED SO AS TO GIVE INCORRECT INFORMATION CAN BE
IDENTIFIED AS SUCH BY CREW/GROUND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES WITH NO
ADDITIONAL IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-284
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
3126 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO "A AUTO" OR "B AUTO"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
LEFT - $37; RIGHT - $38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A SWITCH IN A SINGLE POSITION DUE TO A MECHANICAL JAM
RESULTS IN THAT HEATER SYSTEM BEING THE ONLY ONE AVAILABLE FOR
USE DURING FUTURE OPERATIONS. IF CONTAMINATION IS THE CAUSE OF
THE PROBLEM, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR BOTH HEATER SYSTEMS TO
BE ACTIVATED AT THE SAME TIME. THIS CONDITION, HOWEVER, SHOULD
BE DETECTABLE AND CORRECTABLE BY CREW/GROUND ACTIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER FUSES
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: I0 AMP FUSES BETWEEN INPUT POWER AND HEATERS
CAUSES: OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FUSE "BLOWING" CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND NO POWER TO THE
HEATERS. LOSS OF THE HEATERS WILL MEAN LOSS OF THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-286
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/s7
ATCS
3128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD HEATER SELECT SWITCH
FAILED TO "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
3 ) HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
4 ) HEATER SELECT
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
$41
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE HI-LOAD HEATER SELECT SWITCH TO "OFF" MEANS HEAT
IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE AND THE HI-LOAD EXIT DUCT/NOZZLE WILL
FREEZE-UP. LOSS OF THE HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR MEANS ENTRY AT NEXT
PRIMARY LANDING SITE, AND IF COMBINED WITH A LOSS OF ONE FREON
LOOP, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FM), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-287
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD HEATER SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO "A", "B", "A/B", OR "C" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
$41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MECHANICAL JAMMING OF A SWITCH TO A GIVEN HEATER SYSTEM MEANS
THAT ONLY ONE SYSTEM WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.
ASSUMING NO ADDITIONAL FAILURES, THIS SHOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE
CONDITION. A FAILURE BY CONTAMINATION RAISES THE POSSIBILITY
THAT MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM COULD BE POWERED AT THE SAME TIME.
THIS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED BY CREW AND/OR GROUND
PROCEDURES WITH NO IMPACT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FM), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-288
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER SWITCH STATUS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
V63S2531E (C)
PANEL L1
V63S2511E(A/B) ; V63S2501E(A) ; V63S2521E(B) ;
CAUSES:
FIELDS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, ELECTROMAGNETIC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SENSOR PROVIDING ERRONEOUS INFORMATION CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS
SUCH BY CREW/GROUND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES WITH NO FURTHER IMPACT
TO OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FM), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-289
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
3131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER SWITCH FUSES
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PAR/q4AN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH FUSES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIA2
1 AMP FUSES BETWEEN CONTROL BUS AND SWITCH
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN FUSE INTERRUPTS THE CIRCUIT AND DOES NOT ALLOW ANY POWER
TO THE HEATERS. LOSS OF ONE FUSE MEANS LOSS OF ONE HEATER
SYSTEM; LOSS OF ALL FUSES MEANS LOSS OF ALL HEATERS AND LOSS OF
THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR
MEANS LOSS OF MISSION AND ENTRY TO NEXT PLS. IF COMBINED WITH
THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP, THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR
CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FM), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-290
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
ATCS
3132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER FUSES/RPCS
PREMATURE OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT
INPUT POWER FUSES/RPCS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 5 AMP FUSES PLUS 15 AND 20 AMP FUSES BETWEEN INPUT
POWER AND HEATERS
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN FUSE INTERRUPTS THE CIRCUIT AND DOES NOT ALLOW ANY POWER
TO THE HEATERS. LOSS OF ONE FUSE MEANS LOSS OF ONE HEATER
SYSTEM; LOSS OF ALL FUSES MEANS LOSS OF ALL HEATERS AND LOSS OF
THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR. THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR
COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD ALONE MEANS ENTRY TO
NEXT PLS.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-291
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/28/87
ATCS
3133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER RELAYS
DELAYED OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C
HI-LOAD EVAPORATOR
DUCT HEATERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
RELAY USED TO COMPLETE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUITS
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A RELAY TO OPERATE PROPERLY RESULTS IN AN INCOMPLETE
HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT AND NO POWER TO THE AFFECTED HEATERS.
LOSS OF ONE RELAY ACTION MEANS LOSS OF ONE HEAT SYSTEM; LOSS OF
ALL RELAYS MEAN LOSS OF ALL HEATERS AND LOSS OF THE HI-LOAD
EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD REQUIRES ENTRY TO NEXT PLS.
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD COMBINED WITH LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN
RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
4001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE (NH3)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
AMMONIA STORAGE (A&B)
RELIEF VALVE (NH3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF ONE AMMONIA TANK COULD INITIATE AN EXTERNAL
LEAK IN ONE AMMONIA SYSTEM. THIS LEAKAGE WOULD LEAD TO LOSS OF
ONE REDUNDANT SYSTEM WHICH IS REQUIRED TO COOL THE FREON LOOPS
DURING ABORTS PHASES (EXCEPT ATO). A FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT
SYSTEM ELIMATE COOLING OF THE FREON LOOPS BY THE AMMONIA SYSTEM
AND RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA
ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-293
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6124187
ATCS
4002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
AMMONIA STORAGE (A&B)
RELIEF VALVE (NH3)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF AMMONIA FROM ONE OF TWO TANKS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS, TAL AND AOA ABORTS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO COOL THE FREON LOOPS BY AMMONIA SYSTEM LEADS TO
LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING ABORTS PHASES (EXCEPT ATO).
THE AMMONIA EXITS THE ORBITER THROUGH THE DISCHARGE VENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-294
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (NH3 TANK)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
AMMONIA STORAGE (A&B)
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (NH3 TANK)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO CALCULATE AMMONIA QUANTITY FOR ONE
SYSTEM. LOSS OF THE PRESSURE SENSOR IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM LEADS TO
INABILITY TO CALCULATE AMMONIA QUANTITIES; HOWEVER, SYSTEMS
SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PROPERLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6124/ 7
ATCS
4004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (NH3 TANK)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
AMMONIA STORAGE (A&B)
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (NH3 TANK)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63-MT48, MT49
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO CALCULATE AMMONIA QUANTITY FOR ONE
SYSTEM. LOSS OF THE TEMPERATURE SENSOR IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM LEADS
TO INABILITY TO CALCULATE AMMONIA QUANTITIES; HOWEVER, SYSTEMS
SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PROPERLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-296
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4005 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER A (B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY-AREA 50
PART NUMBER: 50V63AI-AI, A2
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS AN INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE VALVES FOR ONE AMMONIA SYSTEM
DUE TO THE FAILED CONTROLLER. ANY OTHER FAILURE THAT ELIMINATES
THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS,
TAL, AND AOA ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-297
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7117187
ATCS
4006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER A (B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI-AI, A2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING ASCENT THE AMMONIA MAY PROVIDE GREATER THAN THE REQUIRED
COOLING TO THE ORBITER, WHICH REQUIRES CREW ACTION. FOR ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS, HELIUM ESCAPES FROM THE TANK AND PRESSURE ON AMMONIA
IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT
PHASE (EXCEPT ATO), ONE SYSTEM IS LOST DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
CONTROL THE AMMONIA VALVES. ANOTHER FAILURE THAT ELIMINATES THE
REDUNDANT SYSTEM LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS, TAL,
AND AOA ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-298
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
4007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER (A&B)
PRIMARY & SECONDARY
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI-LV3, LV4, LV5, LV6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE OF AMMONIA EXITING ONE OF TWO TANKS RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ONE LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA ABORTS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO COOL THE FREON LOOPS BY THE AMMONIA SYSTEM,
LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING ABORT PHASES (EXCEPT
ATO) .
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-299
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER (A&B)
PRIMARY & SECONDARY
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63A1-LV3, LV4, LV5, LV6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY WITHIN A SYSTEM IS REDUCED DUE TO LOSS OF ONE
CONTROL VALVE. A FAILURE TO THE REDUNDANT CONTROL VALVE LEADS TO
LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-300
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6124187
ATCS
4009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N. O. )
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER (A&B)
PRIMARY & SECONDARY
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI-LV3, LV4, LVS, LV6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF AMMONIA THROUGH THE VALVE REDUCES THE AMOUNT
OF AMMONIA ENTERING THE HEAT EXCHANGER; HOWEVER, THE SYSTEMS
SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN A DEGRADED MODE. THE EFFECTS OF
AMMONIA IN THE AFT BODY ARE UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS
EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/ v
ATCS
4010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMERATURE SENSOR (NH3 CONTROLLER)
ERRONEOUS INPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER (A&B)
PRIMARY & SECONDARY
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI-MTI, MT2, MT3, MT4, MTS, MT6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR LEADS TO FEEDBACK LOSS TO THE AMMONIA
CONTROLLER. THE FEEDBACK FROM THIS SENSOR IS USED TO POSITION A
CONTROL VALVE. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THESE
CONTROL VALVES RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE AMMONIA SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-302
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24187
ATCS
4011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER (A&B)
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI-LVl, LV2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CORROSION,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE OF AMMONIA EXITING ONE OF TWO TANKS RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ONE LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA ABORTS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO COOL BOTH FREON LOOPS BY THE AMMONIA SYSTEM,
LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING ABORT PHASES (WITH
THE EXCEPTION OF ATO).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
4012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N. C. )
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
CONTROLLER (A&B)
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI-LV1, LV2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF AMMONIA FROM ONE OF TWO TANKS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA ABORTS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO COOL BOTH FREON LOOPS BY THE AMMONIA SYSTEM,
LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING ABORT PHASES (EXCEPT
ATO). THE EFFECTS OF THE AMMONIA LEAKING INTO THE AFT BODY ARE
UNKNOWN; HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER
PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-304
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE (FREON)
NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON 21 TO NH3), EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AILVl
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING THE DEPLETION OF FREON FROM ONE COOLANT LOOP ENTRY IS
REQUIRED AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE. A SECOND FAILURE TO
THE REDUNDANT LOOP RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE. HOWEVER,
LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO THE AFT BODY DOES NOT EFFECT THE
ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-305
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
ATCS
4014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (NH3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
CAUSES:
STRESS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL LEAK THAT ELIMINATES FLOW THROUGH THE HEAT EXCHANGER
RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA
ABORTS. THE EFFECTS OF AMMONIA IN THE AFT BODY ARE UNKNOWN;
HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-306
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4015 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: TANK DISCONNECTS, LINES AND FITTINGS (RELIEF VALVE
TO ISOLATION VALVE)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
LINES & FITTINGS (RELIEF VALVE TO ISOLATION VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY-AREA 50
50V63AI
CAUSES: CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF AMMONIA FROM ONE OF TWO TANKS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA ABORTS. LOSS OF
ALL ABILITY TO COOL THE FREON LOOPS BY THE AMMONIA SYSTEM LEADS
TO LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING ABORT PHASES (EXCEPT
ATO). THE EFFECTS OF AMMONIA IN THE AFT BODY ARE UNKNOWN;
HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE I1/24/87 C-307
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES & FITTINGS (ISOLATION VALVE TO BOILER)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
3) LINES & FITTINGS (ISOLATION VALVE TO BOILER)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
STRESS, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL LEAK THAT ELIMINATES FLOW THROUGH THE HEAT EXCHANGER
RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA
ABORTS. THE EFFECTS OF AMMONIA IN THE AFT BODY ARE UNKNOWN;
HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-308
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4017 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES (BOILER TO DISCHARGE VENT)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
LINES & FITTINGS (BOILER TO DISCHARGE VENT)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
CAUSES: CORROSION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE AMMONIA SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION PROPERLY. AMMONIA
ENTERS THE AFT BODY DUE TO THIS FAILURE MODE, INSTEAD OF VENTING
OVERBOARD. THE EFFECTS OF AMMONIA IN THE AFT BODY ARE UNKNOWN;
HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON ORBITER
PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (NH3 EXHAUST)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS OFF-SCALE (HIGH/LOW)
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM (ABS)
LINES
EXHAUST DUCT
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FREON COOLANT LOOP SENSORS WHICH ARE DOWNSTREAM OF THE AMMONIA
BOILER, PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PERFORMANCE DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-960102
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-310
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4019 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (NH3 CONTROLLER)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
PANEL LIA2 (l.2K)
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4RI3, A4RI4, A4RIS, A4RI6, A4RI7, A4R18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CONTROL ONE AMMONIA SYSTEM BY THE GPC OR MANUALLY,
DEPENDING ON THE FAILED RESISTOR. THE REDUNDANT CIRCUIT
CONTINUES TO OPERATE THE CONTROL VALVES. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO POSITION THE CONTROL VALVES IN ONE SYSTEM, FREON
LOOPS ARE COOLED USING THE STANDBY SYSTEM DURING RTLS, TAL, AND
AOA ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-311
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/8v
ATCS
4020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (NH3 CONTROLLER)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST : W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR (I.2K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4RI3, A4RI4, A4RI5, A4RI6, A4RI7, A4RI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OVERCURRENT IN THE CIRCUIT ELIMINATES ONE METHOD OF
POSITIONING CONTROL VALVES FOR ONE SYSTEM. THE REDUNDANT CIRCUIT
CONTINUES TO OPERATE CONTROL VALVES. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
TO POSITION THE CONTROL VALVES IN ONE SYSTEM, THE
FREON LOOPS ARE COOLED USING THE STANDBY SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-312
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ATCS FLIGHT: 3/3
4021 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEC/ON
SWITCH 42 (NH3 CONTROLLER)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM PRI/GPC, FAILS TO SWITCH FROM
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 42
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA2 -$42, $43
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION, SYSTEM OPERATES NOMINALLY.
FOR A FAILURE IN THE MANUAL POSITION, ONE SYSTEM OPERATES UNTIL
PRESSURE ON AMMONIA IS LOST. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO COOL
FREON DURING RTLS, TAL, AND AOA ABORTS,
CREW AND VEHICLE ARE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-313
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
7/15/8 
ATCS
4022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH 42 (NH3 CONTROLLER)
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
PANEL LIA2
SWITCH 42
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINCE ISOLATION AND CONTROL VALVES CANNOT BE POSITIONED, ONE
AMMONIA SYSTEM IS LOST. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO COOL FREON
USING THE REDUNDANT AMMONIA SYSTEM LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-314
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/15/87
ATCS
4023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (NH3 FEEDBACK)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR (5.1K)
CRITICALITIES
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA2-A4R9, A4RI0, A4RII, A4RI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TELEMETRY INDICATING THE POSITION OF NH3 BOILER SWITCH IS LOST.
HOWEVER, THE SWITCH POSITION IS DETERMINED BY FEEDBACK FROM OTHER
MEASUREMENTS (I.E.-SWITCH OR FREON LOOP).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-315
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ATCS FLIGHT:
4024 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (NH3 FEEDBACK)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
PANEL LIA2
RESISTOR (5.1K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] s[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK-AREA 30
31V73AIA2-A4R9, A4RI0, A4RII, A4RI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS,VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TELEMETRY INDICATING THE POSITION OF NH3 BOILER SWITCH IS LOST.
HOWEVER, THE SWITCH POSITION IS DETERMINED BY FEEDBACK FROM OTHER
MEASUREMENTS (I.E.-SWITCH OR FREON LOOP).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-316
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4025 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODES (GPC)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
ALCA (PRI/GPC)
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
(ZONE 7, 7)
AFT AVIONICS BAY 4 AREA 54
54V76AI21-CR, CR (ZONE 12, 12); 56V76AI23-CR, CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF A DIODE INHIBITS THE COMMAND OF ONE AMMONIA BOILER
SYSTEM BY THE GPC. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO COMMAND AMMONIA SYSTEMS
USING THE GPC REQUIRES CREW ACTION SWITCHING FROM GPC TO MANUAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/15/sv
ATCS
4026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODES (GPC)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
ALCA (PRI/GPC)
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
(ZONE 7, 7)
AFT AVIONICS BAY 4 AREA 54
54V76AI21-CR, CR (ZONE 12, 12); 56V76AI23-CR, CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
BOTH AMMONIA SYSTEMS OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN SWITCHES 42 AND
43 ARE IN THE GPC POSITION. THE AMMONIA SYSTEM OPERATES
NOMINALLY, WHEN THE SWITCH ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILED DIODE IS IN
THE OFF POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO COMMAND AMMONIA
SYSTEM USING THE GPC REQUIRES CREW ACTION IN SWITCHING FROM GPC
TO MANUAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-318
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
71151s7
ATCS
4027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER (POWER-PRI/GPC)
FAILS "ON"
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD : W. E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
ALCA
HYBRID DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAY 4 AREA 54
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21-ZONE 6, 7; 55V76A122-ZONE 8, 8;
56V76AI23-ZONE II, Ii, 12, 12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A HYBRID DRIVER THAT FAILS "ON" HAS NO EFFECT ON THE CIRCUIT,
SINCE THE DRIVERS ARE IN SERIES. AN INPUT FROM THE SWITCH TO THE
NON-FAILED DRIVER MUST OCCUR BEFORE THE CIRCUIT WILL OPERATE. IF
ALL REDUNDANCY IN CIRCUIT IS LOST, HYBRID
DRIVERS COULD OPEN AN ISOLATION VALVE, THEREBY DEPLETING AMMONIA
FROM ONE OF TWO TANKS. CONTROL VALVES SHOULD REGULATE THE AMOUNT
OF AMMONIA RELEASED AND PROTECT AGAINST UNDER COOLING THE FREON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i1/24/87 C-319
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
ATCS
4028
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER (NH3 CONTROLLER)
FAILS "OFF", OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM
ALCA
HYBRID DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAY 4 AREA 54
PART NUMBER: 54V76A121-ZONE 6, 7; 55V76AI22-ZONE 9, 9;
56V76AI23-ZONE ii, Ii, 12, 12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE INABILITY TO CONTROL AMMONIA SYSTEM BY THE GPC OR MANUALLY,
DEPENDS ON THE FAILED DRIVER. THE REDUNDANT CIRCUIT CONTINUES TO
OPERATE CONTROL VALVES. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO POSITION
ISOLATION AND CONTROL VALVES FOR ONE SYSTEM, BOTH FREON
LOOPS ARE COOLED USING THE STANDBY SYSTEM DURING RTLS, TAL, AND
AOA ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/87 C-320
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID
i000
i001
1003
1004
1005
1006
1009
i011
1014
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1032
1033
FLIGHT
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
3/2R
3/2R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM NAME
INLET SELF-SEALING
COUPLING
ORIFICE INLET COUPLING
INLET FILTER -
ACCUMULATOR
INLET FILTER -
ACCUMULATOR
ACCUMULATOR
SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT
INLET FILTER FREON
PUMP
FREON PUMP
OUTLET FILTER
CHECK VALVE
OUTLET SELF-SEALING
COUPLING
ORIFICE (OUTLET
COUPLING)
FUEL CELL HEAT
EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT
EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT
EXCHANGERS
FUEL CELL HEAT
EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT
EXCHANGER
FUEL CELL HEAT
EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT
EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT
EXCHANGERS
HYDRAULIC HEAT
EXCHANGERS
HYDRAULIC HEAT
EXCHANGERS
HYDRAULIC HEAT
EXCHANGER
HYDRAULIC HEAT
EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
FAILURE MODE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE )
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
FAILS TO CLOSE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(F21 TO FC40)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(F21 TO F21)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FC40 TO FC40)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FC40)
RESTRICTED FLOW (F21)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(F21 TO HYDRAULIC
FLUID)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON TO FREON)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(HYDRAULIC TO HYD)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON 2 i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(HYDRAULIC FLUID)
RESTRICTED FLOW
(FREON 21)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(F21 TO GSE LINES)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(F21 TO F21)
D-2
MDAC-I D
1034
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1048
1049
1051
1053
1055
1056
1057
1060
1061
1062
1063
1065
1066
1067
1069
1070
i071
1072
1076
ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS - CONT'D.
FLIGHT
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
3/2R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM NAME FAILURE MODE
GSE HEAT EXCHANGERS
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
02 RESTRICTOR
02 RESTRICTOR
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT
EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT
EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT
EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT
EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT
EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT
EXCHANGER
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT
EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER
SERVICING QUICK
DISCONNECT CAP
FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV
FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
MIDBODY COLDPLATES
ORIFICE (AFT AVIONICS
COLDPLATES)
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES
RGA COLDPLATES
RGA COLDPLATES
RGA COLDPLATES
FREON LOOP LINES AND
FITTINGS
SWITCH (FREON PUMPS)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON 21)
RESTRICTED FLOW
(FREON 2 I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (02 )
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON 21)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON TO WATER)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON TO FREON)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(WATER TO WATER)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON 21)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(WATER)
RESTRICTED FLOW
(FREON 2 i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
(WATER)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (F21
TO P/L EXCHANGER FLUID)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON TO FREON)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON 2 I)
RESTRICTED FLOW (F21)
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS IN INTERMEDIATE
POSIT, RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS IN PUMP "OFF"
POSITION
D-3
ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS - CONT'D.
MDAC-ID
1085
1086
1089
2000
2001
2002
2OO5
2009
2010
2011
3012
3014
3015
3016
3017
3019
3020
3029
3030
3046
3047
3048
3049
3051
3052
3053
3067
3079
3088
3089
FLIGHT
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
1/1
2/1R
2/2
2/1R
2/1R
2/2
2/1R
2/2
2/IR
3/2R
ITEM NAME
CB (FREON FLOW
PROPORTIONING VALVE)
SWITCH (FLOW
PROPORTIONING VALVE)
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
(ATCS OF1)
INLET SELF-SEALING
COUPLING
OUTLET SELF-SEALING
COUPLING
FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS,
TUBES
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
MOTOR (BYPASS VALVE)
MODE CONTROL VALVE
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
CORE
HI LOAD/VALVE
MOUNTING PLATE
HI LOAD VALVE
MOUNTING PLATE
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
ACOD
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR
ACOD
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT
HI LOAD NOZZLE
HI LOAD NOZZLE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
WATER VLV/NOZZLE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
WATER VLV NOZZLE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CORE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
CORE
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
ACOD
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
ACOD
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
EXIT DUCT
FES FEEDLINE A/B
FES CONTROLLER-SWITCH
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
FAILS WITH VALVE IN
MID-TRAVEL POSITION
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT,
LOSS OF OUTPUT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO START
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON)
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE (FREON)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON TO WATER)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAK BETWEEN WATER
AND FREON
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE -
FREON
RESTRICTED FLOW -
WATER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE -
FREON
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
RESTRICTED FLOW -
WATER
LEAKAGE
FAILS IN "ON"
ONE OR MORE CONTACTS
STUCK IN OFF POSITION
ONE OR MORE CONTACTS
NOT MAKING IN OFF
D-4
ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS - CNCLD.
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM NAME
3118
3128
4001
4002
4005
4006
4007
4011
4012
4013
4014
4015
4016
4021
4022
FAILURE MODE
2/2
2/IR
(A) 2/IR
(A) 2/IR
(A) 2/IR
(A) 2/IR
(A) 2/IR
(A) 2/IR
(A) 2/IR
2/IR
(A) i/I
(A) 2/IR
(A) i/i
(A) 2/IR
(A)2/IR
TOPPING EVAPORATOR
HEATER SELECT SWITCH
HI-LOAD HEATER SWITCH
NH3 RELIEF VALVE
RELIEF VALVE
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
NH3 BOILER/HEAT
EXCHANGER
NH3 BOILER/HEAT
EXCHANGER
TANKS, LINES, &
FITTINGS
LINES & FITTINGS
SW 42 (NH3 CONTROLLER)
SW 42 (NH3 CONTROLLER)
FAILS IN OFF POSITION
FAILED TO "OFF"
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PREMATURE OPERATION
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED, EXT LEAKAGE
INT/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(FREON 21 TO NH3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(NH3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO SW FROM PRI/
GPC OR SEC/ON
FAILS TO SWITCH
FROM OFF
D-5

